CHAPTER 7

'Et todas las otras cosas deve omne sofrir que començar guerra, salvo la desonra. Ca non tan solamente la guerra - en que ha tantos males - mas aun la muerte - que es la mas grave cosa que puede seer - deve omne ante sofrir que pasar et sofrir desonra.'

On 13 August 1325, the Feast of St. Hippolytus, Alfonso XI turned fourteen. According to the traditions of Castile, he was now of age and therefore entitled to dissolve the regency government which had served him so inadequately since the death of his grandmother María de Molina in 1321. And, troubled by reports of a fresh Muslim assault against the southern borders of his realm, Alfonso did not hesitate to do so, proclaiming himself independent of his tutores no later than 15 August, in Valladolid, before a gathering of the estates of Castile.¹

Naturally, his three regents would have been loath to surrender their prestigious titles; yet they appear to have done so without protest,² aware no doubt that, to retain influence on the Castilian political stage, they must remain in the good graces of their young sovereign. But this was not looking like an easy endeavour, since, the royal chronicle records, Alfonso XI had made it plain at Valladolid how dissatisfied he was with their service over the preceding four years.³ We know from a royal communication to the concejo of Murcia around this time that Alfonso considered the Infante Felipe and Juan el tuerto particularly culpable.⁴ In the light of this information, one can readily see why Juan Manuel might have been pessimistic about his political prospects. But his position would in fact take a rather positive upturn.

Through August and into September there was, as one might expect, much jockeying for influence at court. Alfonso XI appointed the urban oligarchs Garcilaso de la Vega and Alvar Núñez de Osorio – trusted counsellors during his minority – as his principal advisers.⁵ This was not pleasing news either for Juan Manuel or for Juan el tuerto, '[porque] ovieron sospecha que aquellos caballeros que eran en la privanza del Rey, et el Judío [don Yuzaf] con ellos, pornian al Rey que les mandase facer algun mal; ca aquellos caballeros siempre fueran en su contrario dellos en el tiempo de las tutorías'. For this reason, we are told, 'un dia salieron de la villa de Valledolid estos Don Joan et Don Joan [...] diciendo á los suyos que el Rey los mandaba matar, et que iban desavenidos dél'.⁶ Alfonso moved to placate his two cousins, conferring the office of mayordomo mayor upon Juan Manuel and that of alférez upon Juan el tuerto.⁷ The king of Castile did so primarily because he needed their men, money and obedience for the projected campaign against the infidel. Moreover, Juan Manuel, now forty-three years of age, was the realm's most experienced military campaigner; a vital cog in Castile’s military machine.

In early October Alfonso XI, wishing in that moment to be absolutely certain of the friendship and allegiance of Juan Manuel, pledged himself to the latter's nine-year-old daughter Constanza.⁸ The agreement of this match, hugely advantageous for the house of Manuel in political terms, must have raised eyebrows, since a royal marriage was primarily a political instrument, and whilst a marriage into the high nobility was not unheard of (indeed, Alfonso’s grandfather Sancho IV had married into the House of Molina), the teenage king was foregoing the opportunity to forge an enduring alliance by this means with another ruling dynasty.

By 13 October the marriage contract had been drawn up and ratified.⁹ Regrettably, this document has not survived the passage of time. We know only that the alcazar of Cuenca, and the royal castles of Huete and Lorca were assigned to Juan Manuel as rehenes to be held in pledge until the birth of the couple's first male child.¹⁰ The marriage was solemnized in Valladolid on Thursday 28 November 1325.¹¹ But it could not yet be consummated, since Constanza 'era de poca edad et el Rey eso mesmo'. The young bride thus was commended into the guardianship of an aya, Teresa, in Valladolid.¹² Shortly after the wedding, Alfonso XI bolstered his amity with his new father-in-law by restoring him to the realm's foremost military title, that of adelantado mayor de la frontera.¹³

With his position in the Castilian court as strong as it could ever be, Juan Manuel was no longer beholden to the House of Aragon, and he felt empowered to settle scores with his brother-in-law the Infant Joan. Early in November, according to the royal chronicle, the Castilian prince, 'voce levata, vulta turbido et iracundo', had complained before the Castilian royal court that both he and Alfonso XI had suffered 'maximam iniuriam' because of the archbishop’s reluctance to perform his duties as Royal Chancellor during his absence from Castile. Joan, present, countered that it was not he who had brought injury to Castile and its king; rather, it was Juan himself, 'qui terram regis devastaverat'. A new argument then began over the archbishop’s refusal in 1324 to allow servicios to be extracted from the inhabitants of his see. Alfonso intervened in the argument, but did not attempt to quell passions. Instead, showing remarkable partiality, he commanded the archbishop to ensure that these servicios were now paid, and removed him from the chancellorship.¹⁴

Towards the end of November, Jaume II – who had been pleased to hear about the marriage of his granddaughter Constanza and Alfonso XI despite the fact that it had been arranged and contracted without his approval,¹⁵ and just a few weeks on from the collapse of the marriage of Alfonso to the Infanta Violante of Aragon – learnt from Brother Pedro de Masquefa of the fall from grace of the Infant Joan and the circumstances in which this had occurred. His anger over this was surely compounded by the other piece of news Pedro relayed:

dictus Johannes [Emmanuelis] quando primo venit ad regem [Castelle] informavit eum qualiter dominus rex Aragonum tenebat partem regni Murcie in magnum preindicium [sic] sui et quod nunquam per terram illam transitum faciebat quiu [sic] amare fleret nec nunquam gauderet donee terra illa ad manum domini Regis reducta esset. Item ut dicitur quod in pactis seu conditionibus matrimonii Regis et filie domini Johannis fuit positum et aditum quod ministerio seu adiuntorio dicti Johannis idem Rex recuperare habet dictam terram.¹⁶

Jaume’s trusted advisor and admiral Bernat de Sarrià, of course, had hinted at Juan Manuel’s scheming just a few weeks earlier, and his suspicions now appeared confirmed.

In an earlier time, the lord of Villena would never have contemplated deceiving his father-in-law. But their relationship was now weaker than it had ever been. And, as father-in-law to the king of Castile, Juan scarcely needed the backing of the House of Aragon. Or so he thought.

With the House of Manuel now firmly attached to the king of Castile, Juan el tuerto – vehemently opposed to entering a government which harboured so many of his enemies – found that he needed new alliances. According to the royal chronicle, 'cató [don Joan fijo del Infante Don Joan] otras maneras para deservir al Rey, dando á entender á las gentes que por su cabo lo podria facer sin ayuda del otro Don Joan'.¹⁷ Lacking options in Castile for a new political friendship, the lord of Vizcaya turned to the king of Aragon (in former times the staunchest supporter of his father the Infante Juan), offering military assistance against Alfonso XI. In return, Juan el tuerto wanted the hand of Jaume’s grand-daughter Blanca, daughter of the Infanta María of Aragon and the late Infante Pedro of Castile. Blanca was a desirable prospect from a financial perspective, for she possessed extensive estates in eastern Castile.¹⁸ Fearing, presumably, that a Castilian attack on Aragon's southern frontier was imminent, and otherwise short of support within Castile, Jaume II did not hesitate to accept this proposal, approving the marriage before 3 December.¹⁹

Alfonso XI could not have approved of this match. Yet the young monarch, a shrewd diplomat despite his tender age, offered no visible resistance,²⁰ for he wished to maintain the fiction of friendly relations with the king of Aragon lest he might later require the military assistance of his eastern neighbour against Granada. Nonetheless, Alfonso's principal counsellor, Garcilaso de la Vega, worked through the early months of 1326 to thwart the solemnizing of the marriage. But his efforts were to prove unsuccessful. Jaume II, for his part, understood that 'aqueste casamiento no se faria sin gran escandalo porque non podia casar donna Blancha con ombre del mundo que tanto pessase al Rey e aun a Garci Lasso'. But the pros of the marriage outweighed the cons, as Jaume’s counsellor Gonzalo García observed: 'si don Johan [fijo del infante don Johan] firme tiene en lo que ya ha jurado e firmara agora por sus mandaderos segunt dize todos los escandalos e las sanyas se podran bien sofrir'.²¹

The seeds of distrust between the Crowns of Aragon and Castile had been sown, of course, by Juan Manuel. But his hubris was such that he did not suspect that the Aragonese royal family could be aware of his machinations. This, at any rate, is suggested by his request late in 1325 to the Infant Alfons (who had influence at the Papal curia) for letters of recommendation for a Manueline envoy whose task it was to procure ecclesiastical dispensation for the consanguineous marriage of Alfonso XI and Constanza Manuel. Alfons, knowing that this marriage was of little benefit to Aragon, refused to produce the required documents. Entirely dependent on this dispensation, the lord of Villena was forced to consider a reconciliation with Alfons’ brother the Infant Joan, archbishop of Toledo, in order to avail of the latter's influence with Pope John XXII. Around the first days of March 1326 the two met at Alcalá de Henares and resolved their differences. Shortly after, with credentials presumably secured, Juan dispatched an embassy to the Holy See.²²

By mid-April there was still no bull of dispensation. Concerned, the lord of Villena dispatched another envoy, his chaplain Juan Pérez de Avila, to the Holy See and implored Jaume II to improve the chances of success of this third mission with supporting letters.²³ Papal dispensations were seldom processed rapidly, and although Juan Manuel probably understood this, he was nevertheless impatient, more than likely because he knew that any delay in finalising the marriage raised the chance that Alfonso XI might look for another match.

Securing the marriage would also allow both Juan Manuel and the king of Castile to devote their full attention to fighting the Muslims of Granada, whose aggressive operations in the Andalusian countryside had intensified.²⁴ Since attaining the levers of government, Alfonso XI had been eager to lead an army against the Muslims; but ongoing conflicts with certain lay and ecclesiastical grandees, along with broader problems of law and order, made any prolonged absence from Castile hazardous.²⁵ For this reason, Alfonso entrusted the campaign against the infidel to his adelantado de la frontera. Probably around July or early August 1326, and certainly no earlier than 11 May, the date on which he founded the Augustinian Monastery of San Agustín in Garcimuñoz,²⁶ Juan Manuel proceeded to Cordoba, where he linked up with the companies of the military Orders of Calatrava, Alcántara, and Santiago, and the concejos of Andalusia. According to the royal chronicle, on learning that the renowned Marinid campaigner Uthman was in Antequera preparing a Granadan army for an assault on Cordoba:

Don Joan con estas compañas salió de Córdoba, et fueron buscar á Ozmin et la caballeria de Granada. Et acesció que cerca del rio de Guadalforce ayuntáronse en pelea los Christianos con los Moros, et fué vencido Ozmin et todo el poder de Granada, et morieron y muchos moros.²⁷

Given that Uthman had led the army which had pursued the infantes Juan and Pedro to their deaths in the vega of Granada seven years earlier, the taste of this victory must have been especially sweet.

News of this outstanding military success filled Alfonso XI with joy.²⁸ And it also cheered Jaume II, who on 14 October wrote to congratulate his son-in-law: 'entendiemos [...] como erades entrado a tierra de moros e auiades auida victoria escontra los enemigos de la fe de la qual cosa sabe Dios avemos grant plazer por dos raçones la primera por el seruicio de Dios e la segunda por la uuestra honrra.'²⁹

Juan Manuel’s status appeared secure. He was the commander of the Castilian army and enjoyed the favour of the kings of Castile and Aragon. And, by God’s will, his daughter would soon become Queen of Castile. Yet he lived in a time of deep instability, when fortunes could be reversed without warning.

The victory over Uthman was certainly significant. But much remained to be done to prevent the Muslims of Granada, aided by their African co-religionists the Banu Marin, from overrunning Andalusia. The tidings of Juan Manuel's military achievement had only added to Alfonso XI's burning desire to lead a royal army into battle against these infidels, but the young king could not leave Castile until he had dampened down the prevalent aristocratic unrest. His primary concern was the redoubtable Juan el tuerto, who, by virtue of his union to Jaume II’s granddaughter Blanca, now possessed important strongholds not only across Old Castile but also along the Aragonese border. Moreover, the lord of Vizcaya could now count on the king of Aragon as an ally.

Uneasy with this situation, Alfonso XI resolved to use whatever means necessary to permanently eradicate the danger posed to his kingdoms by the Infante Juan's successor. According to the royal chronicle, the king of Castile, 'seyendo en Toro envió sus mandaderos a Don Juan [fijo del Infante Don Juan], con quien le envió decir, que él queria enderezar su facienda para ir á la frontera á guerra de los Moros, et que tenía por bien que fuese con él'. Juan el tuerto, suspicious of the king's adviser Garcilaso, responded that 'en quanto Garcilaso estodiese en la su casa [del Rey], et fuese del su consejo, que no vernia y: ca sabia cierto que le buscaria el mayor daño que podiese'. To dampen this concern, Alfonso XI sent Alvar Núñez de Osorio to the lord of Vizcaya, who, we are told, promised that 'si Garcilaso, ó otro alguno [...] quisiese deservir [á el Señor de Vizcaya], o ser contra él, que [...] sería en su ayuda et en su servicio'.³⁰ On Thursday 30 October Juan el tuerto, reassured by Núñez's words, made his way to Toro for conversations with Alfonso XI. The king of Castile received his vassal cordially, proposing that they share a meal together at the royal table on the following day. The lord of Vizcaya accepted the invitation. Upon his return to the royal palace to dine, Juan was set upon by the king’s guards and murdered.³¹

The assassination of Juan el tuerto sent a jolt of fear through every magnate of the realm. Not since Alfonso X’s execution of his brother the Infante Fadrique in 1277 had a leading aristocrat been so severely dealt with by a Castilian monarch.³² News of the murder disquieted Juan Manuel, still in Andalusia, not least because he suspected that Garcilaso and Alvar Núñez, to retain their influence over Alfonso XI, would work to turn the young sovereign against other leading Castilian noblemen. And, beyond the king's inner circle of aides, there was no aristocrat more influential than the lord of Villena. His apprehension was sharpened by a rumour circulating that Alfonso XI was preparing to abandon his consort Constanza.³³ Was this rumour grounded in fact? Juan could not know for sure. But if the king of Castile was indeed turning against him, then it was surely imprudent to remain among royal troops. Thus, before the close of 1326, the lord of Villena abandoned Andalusia and made his way via Chinchilla to Garcimuñoz, perhaps his safest stronghold.³⁴

Although the royal chronicle declares that Alfonso XI could not understand why his adelantado mayor de la frontera chose to leave the conflict in Andalusia,³⁵ it would be naive to think that he did not have some idea. The king well knew that Juan Manuel and Juan el tuerto had been allies. Perhaps his age, and the insistence of his aides, made Alfonso believe that the elimination of the lord of Vizcaya would at a stroke restore harmony in Castile and make it easier for him to engage the Moors. Instead, it only served to worsen the situation. It was probably in January 1327 when he first noticed the impact. In that month, Alfonso invited the kingdom’s grandees to Segovia to discuss tactics for the projected royal operation against the infidel. But, fearing for their safety, many refused to attend. And those who did show up must have been unsettled by a new round of royal brutality:

quiso el Rey facer escarmiento en los de Segovia por las muertes que fecieron: et [...] mandó saber por pesquisa quales fecieron aquellas muertes que la estoria ha contado, et quemaron la iglesia. Et fueron presos muchos de aquellos que lo avian fecho, et fué dado juicio contra ellos: et algunos arrastraron, et despues enfocaronlos; et á otros quebraron por los espinazos por el quebrantamiento de la cadena: et á otros cortaron los piés et las manos et los degollaron; et á otros quemaron por el fuego que posieron en la Iglesia, de que quemaron la torre: dando á cada unos dellos la pena segun lo que fecieron.³⁶

The Toro episode had wider ramifications. Diplomatic relations between Castile and Aragon through the first half of 1326 had, as we have seen, been somewhat uneasy. But they improved to the extent that, by October of that year, preliminary negotiations were under way to renew the Treaty of Agreda, the alliance of mutual friendship and aid agreed by the Peninsula's Christian states in 1304. However, on learning of the murder of Juan el tuerto (whose father, it may be recalled, had been instrumental in the production of that treaty), Jaume II abandoned the initiative.³⁷ Relations worsened early in 1327 when a Manueline courier acquainted Jaume with the circulating rumour that Alfonso XI no longer wanted his marriage to Constanza Manuel. Concerned about the dishonour this would bring upon his family (Constanza was, of course, his granddaughter), the king of Aragon moved to strengthen his ties with her father, promising in a communication dated 8 February – carefully worded lest it should fall into the wrong hands – to furnish Juan Manuel with military support against Alfonso XI should the latter refuse to provide an assurance that he would not separate from Constanza:

Fiamos en Dios et tenemos que con la vuestra sauienza et con las buenas maneras que uos sabredes hauer et tener los feytos vendran de otra manera e a bien todauia catando vuestro cuerpo. Pero si lo que Dios no mande vinieren en otra manera si menester fuere nos catando el buen deudo que auedes con nos e con la nuestra casa rendremos escuentra uos nuestro deudo bien e complidamente.³⁸

The enmity of Juan Manuel was something that Alfonso XI did not need at this time. For more than a year the young monarch had resisted the temptation to lead an army into Andalusia and was itching to head South. And he needed his seasoned adelantado de la frontera at the helm of the royal army, not fomenting new unrest in Castile. Before making his way to Segovia in January, Alfonso had pressed Juan to return to the South, dispatching a messenger to tell him that 'pues que era su Adelantado de la frontera, et tenia grand parte de las sus rentas del Rey en tierra, porque él era tenido de lo servir'.³⁹

This call to arms was ignored.⁴⁰ Further setbacks lay ahead. As the royal army was preparing to leave for Seville, Alfonso’s uncle, the Infante Felipe, fell ill in Madrid and died.⁴¹ This must have damaged morale, for the infante was a pivotal figure in the Castilian army, possessing not just proven military expertise but also a sound knowledge of the geography of Andalusia.⁴² And, upon his arrival in Seville (20 March or earlier), the king of Castile received the unwelcome news that the townsfolk of Lorca had agreed a truce with their Muslim neighbours.⁴³ Traditionally sympathetic to house of Manuel, the Lorcans had almost certainly made this agreement at the behest of the lord of Villena, who, forced to consider how he might safeguard his honour should the king of Castile do the unthinkable and repudiate Constanza, may well have been desperate enough to pursue a military understanding with the king of Granada.⁴⁴

Whilst waging war against the king of Castile was an option, it was not a course of action which Juan Manuel was particularly keen to pursue. What he really wanted was for things to return to how they were in the previous year, when he had enjoyed Alfonso's favour and patronage. Yet he knew that so long as Castile's teenage monarch remained under the sway of Garcilaso de la Vega and Alvar Núñez, the House of Manuel could not prosper. Convinced that 'estos omnes que tienen el Rey en poder' – as he described them in a letter to Jaume II – were behind Alfonso XI’s apparent wish to separate from Constanza, Juan Manuel urged his father-in-law to use his influence over Garcilaso to keep the marriage intact.⁴⁵ It seems that no progress was made in this regard, for the lord of Villena, concerned that Alfonso XI was continuing to follow the counsel of Garcilaso and Núñez ('como es moço e non vee nin oye nin sabe faser sino lo que ellos mandan'), felt compelled to write again to Jaume, this time soliciting an assurance of defence and help if diplomacy failed to improve the situation. ⁴⁶

The relationship between Juan Manuel and Alfonso XI came under further strain when Alfonso, accepting that Juan could not be convinced to render military service and desperately needing military leadership in Murcia, instructed the city’s inhabitants on 29 April to obey Pedro López de Ayala until further notice.⁴⁷ Though this was by all appearances nothing more than a practical and expedient measure (Juan was not stripped of the office of adelantado), the tone of a letter of 9 May from Bernat de Sarrià to Jaume II on this affair suggests that the lord of Villena perceived the appointment of Pedro López as a personal slight.⁴⁸ Indeed, it would scarcely have been out of character for him to have taken umbrage.

Around this time a new rumour took hold: Alfonso XI, some were claiming, had agreed to marry the Infanta María, daughter of the king of Portugal.⁴⁹ No later than 6 May Juan Manuel and his brother-in-law the Infant Joan reported this to Jaume Il. The Aragonese king found it difficult to credit, and wrote to tell the lord of Villena as much:

E nos non creemos en ninguna manera quel Rey de Castiella fiziesse lo de que vos dubtades de lexar la reyna vuestra filla e nieta nuestra. Porque en esto faria desonrra muyt grant a vos qui sodes de la su casa de Castiella e a nos esso mismo e ahun que seria obra muy mala.⁵⁰

Yet, in the light of all that he had heard since the start of the year, Jaume could scarcely discard this rumour. Thus, he dispatched a messenger to challenge the Portuguese royal family on the purported engagement,⁵¹ proposing – possibly as a test of integrity – an alternative match between María and the Infant Pedro of Aragon.⁵² Although we do not have any record of the reply from the house of Portugal, it seems likely that it was not especially favourable, for on 22 July the king of Aragon felt compelled to to send an embassy to the papal curia to insist that dispensation for the union between Alfonso XI and María of Portugal (first cousins) be denied, on the grounds that its authorisation would cause in Castile 'inestimabilia nocumenta'. By that date, Jaume had dispatched a separate embassy to Andalusia to urge Alfonso XI to preserve his marriage to Constanza.⁵³ But the young sovereign was intent on uniting the houses of Castile and Portugal, and shortly after 1 August confirmed as much to Portuguese envoys.⁵⁴

Around the close of the summer Juan Manuel and his father-in-law Jaume II, reconciled to the fact that Alfonso XI had chosen to abandon Constanza Manuel and marry María of Portugal, began preparations for a war of honour against the Castilian king. Evidence of such arrangements may be seen in Bernat de Sarrià's 29 August note to the Aragonese court that he was heading to the Ayora valley 'e dalli veurem ab don Johan [Manuel] e fare fortificar e fer lo mur de la vila dayora segons que ja le començat',⁵⁵ and in a request of 12 September from the Infant Alfons of Aragon to the lord of Villena for safe passage through the latter's lands for a Muslim embassy heading north to Zaragoza to negotiate a military alliance between Granada and Aragon.⁵⁶

Amid these war preparations, tragedy intervened: around the third week of September, Juan Manuel's wife Constança, aged just twenty-seven, breathed her last.⁵⁷ Her brief life had not been a happy one. Like so many other princesses of this epoch, she was treated by her father as little more than a bargaining chip on the table of international diplomacy. Constança’s betrothal to Juan Manuel happened when she was just three years of age, and she was only six when, as part of the marriage contract, she was separated from her siblings and rehomed in a Castilian castle many miles away. And there was likewise a degree of distance between the infanta and her husband, owing to his peripatetic lifestyle and the disparity in their ages. Indeed, in 1310 Constança’s aya Saurina de Bessers reported to the Aragonese court that Juan had informed her that 'no enten de casar ab la infanta sino per aver infants'.⁵⁸ It is plausible that loneliness contributed to bouts of poor health during her formative years. According to available chancery records, we know that the Aragonese court doctor Guillén Barberá visited the infanta to administer medication on at least two occasions in 1307,⁵⁹ and in 1315 he went to her again at the behest of Jaume, who had learnt of 'las muytas enfermedades que avia, e assi que era ya cayda en specie de ética (tuberculosis) ';⁶⁰ indeed, so grave was her condition at that moment that the king of Aragon would ask Juan Manuel for permission to remove her to Valencia, where, he claimed:

aura [la infanta] beneficio del ayre do es nasçida e criada, e aura plazer e consolacion con la infanta dona Leonor, e con la infanta dona Violante, su hermana, e nos que y enviaremos algunos de sus hermanos, senyaladamente porque aya plazer con ellos; e aun aura y cumplimiento de fisigos e de todas otras cosas medicinales, las quales se troban millor aca que alla.⁶¹

But Juan Manuel would not allow his teenage wife to be moved out of Castile.⁶²

In the turbulent years after the deaths of the infantes Juan and Pedro, the Infanta Constança grew ever more anxious to see her father. In 1320 she made arrangements to visit him in Valencia but, again, was prevented from travelling by her husband.⁶³ She tried once more in 1323, but her father could not receive her due to his busy itinerary.⁶⁴

The infanta's state of health, both mental and physical, steadily deteriorated. In August 1325 the Infant Joan visited his sister at Garcimuñoz. He found her in a dreadful condition: she was crying incessantly, refusing to take her medication, and wanted desperately to be taken to Valencia. On 12 October, keen to lift his daughter's spirits, Jaume wrote promising that he would see her soon in Valencia.⁶⁵ The November spat between the Infant Joan and Juan Manuel, and the removal of her very young daughter Constanza to Valladolid not long after, can scarcely have helped Constança's state of mind. Indeed, chancery material indicates that she received medical treatment for mental illness on three separate occasions during 1326. Whilst her condition appeared to improve around the close of that year,⁶⁶ she experienced fresh psychological problems in the early part of 1327. Convinced that seeing her father was essential to her convalescence, Constança contacted him in April to fix a summer visit to the Aragonese curia.⁶⁷ But the aging king of Aragon, whose own health was poor, did not reply immediately. Aggrieved, Constança wrote again, this time to berate him for his apparent lack of concern for her well-being and, more specifically, for his failure to send (as requested several times by Juan Manuel) Aragonese court physicians to examine her.⁶⁸ Constança needed medical help urgently, for a new and virulent illness – possibly a fresh bout of tuberculosis – had taken hold.⁶⁹ It was perhaps this illness which accounted for her in September 1327.

As is the case with other misfortunes in the life of Juan Manuel, there is little evidence to help us understand how he reacted emotionally to this event. The fact that he spent most of 1327 in or around Garcimuñoz, where Constança resided during the last months of her life, might at first glance indicate that he was deeply concerned for her well-being toward the end of her life. However, it is equally conceivable that he chose to remain close to that stronghold, deep within his Cuencan territories, primarily for his own safety, conscious that the king of Castile might be plotting his assassination.⁷⁰

Juan Manuel’s sadness was compounded by the death on 2 November of his long-standing friend and ally Jaume II of Aragon at the age of sixty-three. Although their relationship had been inconsistent in recent years, Juan knew that in moments of serious need or difficulty he could always rely on his father‑in‑law for support.

The future was now uncertain. The lord of Villena got on well enough with Jaume Il's heir and successor Alfons (IV), but it remained unclear whether the new king would be as receptive to petitions of help and favour from the Manueline court as his father had been.

More unwelcome news was imminent. In late November or early December Juan Manuel received word that his daughter Constanza had been removed from Valladolid to Toro on the orders of Alfonso XI and locked up in that town’s alcazar. The fact of her imprisonment was troubling enough in itself, but the decision to move her to Toro – the site of the callous murder of Juan el Tuerto – imbued the act with even more ominous implications. The royal chronicler Fernán Sánchez attempts to justify the incarceration of Constanza, writing that the king of Castile had locked her away because:

don Joan hijo del ynfante don Manuel sel avia mostrado por su contrario, ca en tienpo que era ydo el rrey a aquella guerra de los moros este don joan no le vino a servir y enbio a ffazer algunas fablas con el rey de Granada en gran deseruiçio del rrey de Castilla: e catadas todas estas cosas, e acordandose del casamiento que avie fecho con doña Constanca fija de don Joan, que lo fiziera por desviar muchos males e daños que le podrian venir si el con esta rrazon no partiera la amistad que era entre don Joan e don Joan [sennor de Vizcaya].

Sánchez, however, neglects to mention that it was the teenage monarch himself who had sparked this conflict through the assassination of Juan el tuerto and the repudiation of Constanza. Without those actions, Juan Manuel would have had no reason to give up his position of standing within the Castilian court.⁷¹

The lord of Villena, his honour further tarnished, could not contain his fury, repudiating his ties of vassalage with the teenage king and embarking on a ferocious project of violence and rapine against Crown lands.⁷² On 16 December, keen to expand the campaign, Juan wrote to his faithful vassal Pedro Martínez Calvillo, alcaide of Lorca’s castle, asking that he pursue a military alliance with Granada against Alfonso XI and furthermore compel the inhabitants of Lorca to wage war against the citizens of Murcia city (whose unswerving loyalty to the Crown had long been an irritant).⁷³ Letters were created also for the Manueline vassals Sancho Ximénez de Lanclares, Pedro Martínez, Iñigo Ximénez Lorca and Alfonso Fernández, enjoining them to contribute to this war.⁷⁴ But none of these letters arrived. The courier carrying them, the scribe Ruy Pérez, was seized just outside of Librilla by knights loyal to Murcia's de facto governor Pedro López de Ayala. Copies of the letters found on his person were made and sent to Alfonso XI. The Castilian king, occupied at that moment with an operation to break a Marinid siege of Gibraltar,⁷⁵ was predictably incensed by what he read, and on 10 January 1328 directed Pedro López to administer to Ruy Pérez and those captured with him a dreadful punishment: 'que les cortedes los pies e las manos e les saquedes los ojos e los mandedes degollar.'⁷⁶

New letters were produced by the Manueline chancery, and these were delivered successfully. On receipt of his instructions, Calvillo proceeded to the court of the king of Granada. King Nasr, at war already with Alfonso XI, was only too happy to conclude a military arrangement with the House of Manuel against the king of Castile, and by the close of January the latter found his domains under attack on various fronts: from the Moors in Andalusia; from knights and vassals loyal to Juan Manuel around the bishoprics of Cuenca and Sigüenza, the archdiocese of Toledo, the neighbourhoods of Valladolid and Cuéllar, and Can de Roa; and from the lord of Villena himself, who, Fernán Sánchez tells us, took a force against La Cisla (Toledo), 'et quemó et destruyó y muchos logares, et mató y muchos omes, et levó robado todo lo que y falló'.⁷⁷ This episode vividly exposes a double standard of the fourteenth century Castilian nobility: champions of the crusade against the Muslim infidel when it was in their interests, yet, in times of dispute with the crown, only too ready to subordinate religious zeal to political expediency.

Later evidence tells us that Juan Manuel also petitioned Alfons IV to act against the king of Castile. But the Aragonese monarch, keen seemingly to continue the work of his father to revalidate the Treaty of Agreda, was disinclined to render open assistance. Nevertheless, he was familiar with the background of the affair and sympathetic to the lord of Villena's position. Desiring an end to the matter, Alfons dispatched on 20 February an embassy to enjoin Alfonso XI to repair his relationship with Juan Manuel by abandoning his plan to wed María of Portugal and honouring his commitment to Constanza.⁷⁸ Behind the scenes, Alfons allowed his brother the Infant Pere and Jaume de Xérica to assist Juan Manuel on projects of destruction and pillage around Alcaraz, Requena, Atienza, Ayllón, Sepúlveda, Curiel (de Duero), and Fuentidueña.⁷⁹

Alfonso XI, of course, had no intention of restoring his marriage to Constanza Manuel.⁸⁰ A reconciliation with his cousin Juan Manuel mattered less to him at that moment than an alliance with Portugal. Nevertheless, he needed to put a stop to the current campaign of violence and destruction against royal property, and to this end the Castilian king instructed his trusted adviser Garcilaso de la Vega to return north and lead the combat against the enemies of the Crown.⁸¹ But this did not go according to plan. In an ironic twist, Garcilaso – notorious for encouraging Alfonso XI to carry out summary executions – met his end whilst trying to muster forces in Soria, murdered by the inhabitants of this town who feared that he had come to punish or imprison them.⁸²

On learning of his trusted adviser’s demise, Alfonso XI reluctantly abandoned his military operation in Andalusia and returned to Castile, establishing between 17-22 March a siege of the Manueline town of Escalona,⁸³ in the belief, Fernán Sánchez suggests, that if he captured this Toledan stronghold, and Peñafiel too, 'que fincaria mengado [don Johan] de muy grand parte del poder que avia'.⁸⁴ The Castilian king, moreover, sent men to recover the alcazar of Cuenca and the castles of Huete and Lorca, all of which had been handed over in pledge to the House of Manuel to guarantee his marriage to Constanza.⁸⁵ On 1 April, Alfonso XI instructed Juan’s long-standing enemy Guillén de Rocafull to wage war from Abanilla against the lord of Villena, offering him the lands of the latter as compensation for any damage or losses he might sustain as a result of the conflict.⁸⁶

On learning of the siege of Escalona, Juan Manuel assembled his forces and set off to relieve it. But he and his men could not cross the Tagus on account of 'las grandes auenidas que fisieron oganno los rios', so they chose to distract the king of Castile with an assault on the royal property of Huete, employing siege-engines against it.⁸⁷ Sancho Manuel – Juan's illegitimate son – was instructed to ravage around Cuenca.⁸⁸

Eager to intensify the pressure on Alfonso XI, the lord of Villena pressed his brother-in-law Alfons IV again for assistance (8 April).⁸⁹ But the Aragonese monarch would not provide it. Wishing for peace within and between the realm's Christian states, Alfons had already dispatched Gonzalo García to Castile on a mission to reconcile the warring cousins. Commendably, García managed to bring Juan Manuel and Alfonso XI back into dialogue, and they were able to agree a truce.⁹⁰ But that arrangement quickly collapsed. Juan Manuel, understanding that dialogue was necessary if his quarrel with Alfonso was to be resolved, had lifted the siege of Huete and retired to Garcimuñoz.⁹¹ But the king of Castile did not, in return, dissolve the siege of Escalona. The lord of Villena protested to Alfons IV of Aragon, urging him to press the king of Castile to honour the terms of the truce. Alfons IV replied that he had raised the matter at the recent Castilian-Aragonese treaty discussions in Tarazona, and would pursue it again.⁹² Alfons mentioned also that he had heard from Alfonso XI that Juan’s men were still ravaging Crown lands.⁹³ True or not (and it may well have been since, due to the slow methods of communication of this era, not every Manueline vassal or supporter would have become immediately aware of the truce), the fact remained that, in abandoning the siege of Huete, Juan Manuel had made a significant gesture. And the king of Castile had not reciprocated. The lord of Villena, furious over this, recommenced hostilities, launching some time before 17 June a fierce assault against the kingdom of Murcia.⁹⁴ And, desiring greater support from within Castilian aristocracy, he contracted around the same juncture a political union with the powerful Lara family. The arrangement was cemented with Juan Manuel’s marriage to Blanca Núñez. Juan Manuel had reportedly been engaged to Blanca’s mother, Juana ('La Palomilla'), in 1305.⁹⁵ This new marriage had a double importance, for Juan, now in his mid-forties, lacked a male heir.⁹⁶

The conflict between Juan Manuel and Alfonso XI acquired an international dimension with the intervention of Pope John XXII. The pontiff had been told by Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid, Castile's chancellor (and, later on, the author of the royal chronicles cited for this work), that Alfonso had been forced to abandon his campaign against the Moors because of the insubordination of his cousin Juan.⁹⁷ This was a matter of concern for the papacy not only for ideological reasons but also because that project had been underpinned with Church money. The bishop of Cartagena, Pedro Martínez – who had accompanied Fernán Sánchez to the papal curia – was elevated to the rank of cardinal and tasked with mediating between the two feuding kinsmen. Martínez, we are told, spoke first with Alfonso XI. Disappointingly, the only information we have about this episode is what we can find in the royal chronicle; which, in one of the plainest manifestations of Fernán Sánchez's bias against the Castilian aristocracy in general and Juan Manuel in particular, does no more than enumerate the reasons why the king of Castile felt that he could not lift the siege of Escalona. We are not even told whether Martínez spoke to Juan Manuel.⁹⁸

Alfons IV of Aragon, regularly in contact with his friend Pope John XXII over the problems in Castile,⁹⁹ remained committed to the pacification of that realm, and on 13 June 1328 sent his trusted envoy Blasco Maza to the Castilian curia with full authorization to 'tractar e firmar posturas e convenencias por nos en nombre nuestro con el [...] Rey de Castiella e confirmar aquellas que el Rey de Castiella et el Rey de Portugal fizieron agora', on condition that Alfonso XI's chancery produced 'una carta apartada fuera de las ditas posturas en la qual prometa a nos que por rason de las ditas posturas nunca nos requiera que seamos contra el dito don Johan [...] Ca en otra manera seria gran desonestat e reprension nuestra si eramos contra el dicho don Johan'.¹⁰⁰ As a formal ally of the king of Castile, Alfons IV would be well positioned to broker a reconciliation between Alfonso XI and Juan Manuel. However, the ongoing siege of Escalona presented a clear obstacle to negotiations.

In the summer of 1328, the political landscape in Castile shifted significantly. In the previous year, as we have heard, Juan Manuel had told Jaume II that he felt Alfonso XI's regrettable conduct stemmed from the harmful counsel of his three chief advisers: Garcilaso de la Vega, Alvar Núñez de Osorio, and Yusef. There is no doubt that these three, concerned to preserve their status, had been working against the lord of Villena, obstructing any reconciliation with the teenage king. Garcilaso, however, was now dead, and Alvar Núñez was about to lose his place at court. Around late July, Alfonso XI found himself forced to abandon the siege of Escalona 'por algunos movimientos e bollicios que recrecieron en Valladolit'.¹⁰¹ Many important figures in the urban centres of Old Castile were unhappy with how Alfonso XI was conducting affairs of state. And, like Juan Manuel, they believed that the problem lay with the king's advisers. They were particularly concerned about the seemingly excessive influence Alvar Núñez wielded at court, evidenced by his occupation of several royal offices.¹⁰² The king of Castile travelled to Valladolid to address the matter. But a confederation of leading prelates and aristocrats would not admit him into the city whilst Alvar Núñez remained part of the royal entourage. Indeed, so powerful was the alliance of nobles arrayed against the king, and so firm were they in their demand, that Alfonso had no option but to dismiss Núñez.¹⁰³ In a public letter dated 15 August, Alfonso declared that he had taken this course 'por muchos agravios e desafueros quel conde habia fecho e fasia en la mi tierra e por otras cosas muchas que el fasia en la mi casa et en el mio sennorio que non eran mio serviçio'. He would add that he had been wholly unaware ('desapercibido') of the count's malfeasance; but that is truly hard to credit.¹⁰⁴

With the siege of Escalona over and Alvar Núñez removed from court, the political climate in Castile had become decidedly more conducive to a reconciliation between Juan Manuel and his king. Negotiations to that end had begun in the second half of July,¹⁰⁵ and by 24 August the pair seemed to be on amicable terms once more: on that date, Alfonso XI wrote to assure the concejo of Murcia of Juan's future good conduct, a fair sign that he intended to restore the latter to the office of adelantado mayor en el reino de Murcia;¹⁰⁶ and there was talk that the lord of Villena would participate in the forthcoming cortes of Burgos.¹⁰⁷

By October, however, the pair were in dispute again. It was evidently serious, for by the end of that month Juan Manuel's name had once more been removed from the confirmation list of royal charters.¹⁰⁸ It is logical to attribute these new problems to the celebration in the preceding month of the marriage between Alfonso and the Infanta María of Portugal, an event that, quite understandably, would have revived past grievances and affronts to honour.¹⁰⁹ Alternatively, Fernán Sánchez puts the blame for the rift on rumour-mongering by the prior of San Juan Fernán Rodríguez, maintaining that this individual advised Juan by letter that there was a court plot to assassinate him.¹¹⁰ According to Aragonese documentation, the lord of Villena, assisted by his aging half-brother Sancho Manuel, prosecuted that autumn a campaign of devastation and destruction around Toledo and Cuéllar. Additionally, the royal chronicle records that the disgraced Alvar Núñez forged an alliance with the House of Manuel around the same time.¹¹¹ Whilst this is an unexpected and striking claim considering the long-standing enmity between this count and Juan Manuel, political and military exigencies could often foster the most unlikely of coalitions. If Núñez did indeed assist the lord of Villena against Alfonso XI then his help was not available for long, for by the close of 1328 he had met his end at the hands of an assassin named Ramir Flores, operating on the instructions of the king of Castile.¹¹²

In the spring of 1329 Alfonso XI resolved to return to the South to combat the Muslims, and he was able to secure finance from the estates of Castile for that purpose. Mindful of what had happened in the previous year, he did what he could to bring Juan Manuel into obedience, ceding to him the properties of Aza and Galve, and bestowing upon him Castile's two foremost military offices: adelantado mayor en el reino de Murcia and adelantado mayor de la frontera.¹¹³ And, conscious of the fact that the honour of the House of Manuel remained tarnished as a result of his repudiation of Constanza, the king of Castile investigated the possibility of a different yet equally worthy match for the spurned queen, attempting to betroth her to the young Infant Pere, heir to the Crown of Aragon.¹¹⁴

Juan Manuel was impressed by these concessions but nevertheless remained suspicious of Alfonso. History, of course, showed that he had good reason to be. In 1327 the young monarch had lured Juan el tuerto to the royal court with promises of preferment, only to murder him. More recently, Alvar Núñez had been killed on the king’s instructions. And there were whispers of a royal plot against Juan himself. Putting his personal safety above all else, the lord of Villena declined the invitation to accompany the royal host to Andalusia and asked that he be permitted instead to render service from the kingdom of Murcia, 'asi como siempre lo fisiera el infante don Manuel mio padre a los reyes do el viene et yo eso mesmo las mas veses que acaesçio de yr contra los moros'.¹¹⁵

Around the close of 1329 Alfonso XI corresponded with Alfons IV of Aragon – who had agreed to join the crusade against the Muslims – on the matter of Juan Manuel’s military role. Alfons, like his father a wise diplomat, proposed that Juan accompany the Aragonese host in its operations. Alfonso XI indicated that he was willing to accept such a compromise, and in January 1330 the king of Aragon wrote to invite the lord of Villena to join him in battle.¹¹⁶ It was not until the summer that hostilities commenced in earnest. In August 1330 the Christian forces launched a two-pronged assault against the kingdom of Granada. An army led by Alfonso XI established a siege at Teba (Hardales) no later than 7 August,¹¹⁷ capturing this place before the end of that month.¹¹⁸ The king of Castile then took Antequera and Alvochen, followed by the castles of Cañete and Pliego.¹¹⁹ The Christian operation further east had less success. It had been agreed that the king of Aragon should lead the assault from Murcia; but, distracted by events in Sardinia,¹²⁰ his contribution turned out to be meagre: just a small army led the viscount of Cabrera, prior of the Hospitallers, and Jofre Gilbert de Cuilles, governor of the kingdom of Valencia.¹²¹ This force had instructions to meet Juan Manuel, the master of Calatrava, and the bishop of Cartagena in Lorca; but the Lorcans, more than likely ignorant of the projected war against the Muslims, would not admit the Aragonese into their town.¹²² A further issue was that the Murcians, who had a long history of conflict with Juan Manuel, were reluctant to serve under their new adelantado.¹²³

These difficulties were eventually ironed out, and on 21 August a combined army of about three thousand knights and footmen set off from Lorca and entered Granada. According to a bulletin from Jofre Gilabert to the king of Aragon, the Christian force attacked not as a single unit but on two fronts, engaging in skirmishes with the garrisons of Huercal and Vera. His report is detailed enough for us to see that the gains made were, at best, modest.¹²⁴ The operation cannot have lasted more than a week, for on 28 August Juan Manuel was back in Lorca, planning another.¹²⁵ Whether the new project materialized cannot be ascertained; indeed, the only other surviving information we have about the Christian enterprise around Murcia is a letter from the lord of Villena dated 10 October asking Jaume II for materials with which to build galleys (in Cartagena) for a naval assault on Granada.¹²⁶

As far as we can tell, Juan Manuel did what was expected of him at this time to combat the Muslims of Granada. He might not have achieved notable success, but this was probably due more to a lack of resources rather than a lack of intent. After all, his expectation was that he would provide auxiliary support to an Aragonese royal army led by Alfons IV, not that he would direct the operation itself.¹²⁷ The enterprise against Granada as a whole, in fact, does not seem to have been particularly well planned and executed, and that is probably why, around the close of the year, Alfonso XI decided to agree a truce with Nasr of Granada. Fernán Sánchez maintains that he did this:

veyendo de como Don Joan fijo del Infante Don Manuel non queria sosegar en su servicio, et que levára dél los dineros, et non ge los fuera servir: et otrosí que le facia grand daño en la tierra, et que en quanto Don Joan asi lo feciese, non podrian los de la tierra darle lo que él avia menester para la guerra de los Moros.¹²⁸

But the available evidence really does not sustain this view.¹²⁹

Relations between Juan Manuel and Alfonso XI, nonetheless, remained tense, as is evident from Jaume de Xérica’s observation around November 1330 that Juan’s commendable endeavours might not receive the appropriate recognition from his sovereign: 'ell fasiendo bien nol fuese reconocido; ante le pudiesse seer periglo del cuerpo e de lo suyo'.¹³⁰

The impression given is that, however faithfully the lord of Villena served his kingdom in war and maintained his obedience, it was not enough for Alfonso XI.