CHAPTER 5

'Ay muchos omnes que quando están en algún mester fazen mucho por aver las gentes et por las guardar, et después que an acabado aquel fecho, non saben, o no quieren, fazer por las gentes to que deven para les gradesger et galardonar.'

On 8 September 1312, the day after his father's death, the Infante Alfonso, aged just one year and twenty-six days, was crowned Alfonso XI of Castile at Ávila.¹ A scramble for the regency immediately ensued, bringing fresh political instability to Castile. There were two outstanding candidates for the office of tutor: the ageing Infante Juan, who possessed military and diplomatic experience in abundance; and the dynamic but comparatively inexperienced Infante Pedro, to whom the moribund Fernando IV had apparently entrusted the care of his heir.² Juan Manuel, aged thirty and in his prime, was not in the running. It was not that he lacked ambition or support. It was simply that Castilian tradition dictated that regencies be held by a queen or an infante. And Juan was neither.³

The Infante Juan, now backed by his long-time foe Juan Núñez de Lara, solicited the assistance of María de Molina (whose influence and stature remained great), proposing that they share the tasks of government. But the dowager queen, disinclined to stand against her son, would not entertain the idea.⁴ The Infante Pedro, knowing full well that his mother would not oppose him, sought assistance in the first instance from without, writing to his father-in-law Jaume Il for help to become 'sennor de Castella et de Leon paral vuestro seruiçio et para mi pro', sustaining his petition with the proud – and greatly exaggerated – claim that 'todos los de la su tierra [del Rey don Ferrando] me quisieron tomar por tutor de su fijo si que el fino'.⁵

Jaume was already disposed to side with his new son-in-law. The Infante Juan was once again out of favour at the court of Aragon because of his refusal to contribute to the recent Castilian operation against Alcaudete.⁶ Pedro, besides, was a much safer bet: younger, seemingly less variable, he would surely prove a more reliable conduit for Aragonese influence in Castilian affairs. Indeed, in a letter of that autumn to Juan Manuel, Jaume II revealed that he considered Pedro the better candidate.⁷

Before 21 October the Infante Juan, distressed by his failure to win over María de Molina and the building support for his nephew Pedro, resorted to drastic measures, sending Juan Núñez de Lara to Ávila to kidnap the infant king Alfonso XI. The Infante Pedro, returning north with the newly widowed Queen Constança following the completion of truce negotiations at Jaén with Nasr of Granada,⁸ learnt of this brazen operation whilst in Ciudad Real.⁹ He must have lacked substantial support among the greater aristocracy for on 21 October, from Yébenes, he felt compelled to write to Juan Manuel begging for help:

Et don Johan si uos desto no quisieredes doler et quered que uos et yo en uno uayamos y todos los dias deste mundo me echedes una cadena a la garganta para nunca uos salir de mandado et lo del Rey que yo auer podiere et lo mio et el cuerpo et todo quanto yo ouiere todo lo auer en qual guisa uos quisieredes [...]. Ca sabet que esto uos fasiendo assi que me echedes un fierro a los pies para nunca de salir de mandado en todos los tiempos del mundo [...]. Et don Johan uos enbiastes desir et mas quantas uos quisieredes que yo lo faga en todos los dias deste mundo sinon que sea traydor por ello.¹⁰

The Infante Pedro and Juan Manuel were hardly inseparable friends. As highlighted earlier, the lord of Villena was deeply resentful of Pedro’s new amity with Jaume II. Pedro, a zealous crusader, despised his cousin for deserting the siege of Algeciras and lacking interest in the most recent project against Granada.¹¹ But the political situation was critical, and in difficult times the most unlikely alliances could be forged out of expediency.

Expecting that Pedro would prevail in the contest for the tutoría, the lord of Villena threw in his lot with this young prince, setting off from Cuenca for Ávila to help thwart Juan Núñez. By 1 November Juan Manuel had reached his destination.¹² Núñez, however, had been and gone. Upon his arrival in Ávila, the head of the Lara clan and his men had surrounded the Church of San Salvador where the infant monarch was being kept.¹³ But they failed to gain entry. Núñez did at least secure a small but principled success, namely a promise from the citizens of Ávila 'que non diesen el Rey á [el Infante Don Pedro] ni á otro ome poderoso que fuese, fasta que todos los de la tierra se ayuntasen á Córtes, et acordasen á quien le diesen'. Thus, upon his arrival in Ávila, Pedro himself was unable to take custody of the child king.¹⁴

No later than 6 November Juan Manuel and the Infante Pedro left Ávila for Valladolid. In this royal city the latter secured from his mother María de Molina a pledge that she would use her influence with the people of Castile to ensure that he was elected to the office of regent.¹⁵ Thereafter, Pedro formalized his alliance with Juan Manuel, promising his new ally 'en guarda por el [...] Rey don Alfonso el regno de Toledo et el regno de Murcia et el obispado de Cuenca et el obispado de Siguença', regions in which he would possess 'el mismo poder quel dicho infante ouier en lo de que el fuese tutor atanto tiempo como el dicho infante don Pedro terna la dicha tutoria et usara della'.¹⁶ In other words, if Pedro were sworn in as tutor then there would be a de facto sharing of regency powers. This was a heavy concession but a necessary one at that moment, because Pedro was bereft of support across the greater aristocracy. The arrangement was guaranteed by the master of Calatrava Garci López, who swore in writing that:

si por auentura el dicho infante [don Pedro] o otro alguno o algunos uos quisieren seer contrarios o destoradores en ello que nos que uos ayudemos [don Johan] contra ellos porque uos ayades la guarda et el poder segund sobredicho es et fagamos y todo nuestro poder porque se cumpla asi. Et sino que valamos menos por ello.¹⁷

Juan Manuel wasted no time in telling his father-in-law Jaume II about this momentous agreement.¹⁸ Following these talks, Pedro hastened to Ariza for a meeting with the king of Aragon,¹⁹ whilst Juan repaired to the neighbourhood of Atienza, probably to hunt.²⁰

The Infante Juan, furious that his old friend Jaume II was favouring Pedro for the role of tutor,²¹ turned to the Third Estate – whose political importance typically increased when royal authority was weak – for support for his ambitions. In the closing weeks of 1312 he won the backing of the concejo of Burgos,²² and soon after, in Benavente, forged an alliance (hermandad) with as many of the concejos of León as would meet him, along with a pact with Pedro’s younger brother, the Infante Felipe.²³ Wiser in the ways of diplomacy than his younger rival, the Infante Juan next instructed the members of this alliance to be in Sahagún on 15 February for co-operative discussions with the concejos of the kingdom of Castile.²⁴ This was a shrewd move, since a regency administration could not hope to govern effectively without the co-operation of the various municipal councils, who, through their power to veto royal exactions, exercised substantial control over the royal treasury. Nevertheless, it was bound to be the case that the concejos would not be completely aligned in their choice of regent. Indeed, there were deep divisions, and a corresponding worry that the rivalries might plunge the realm into civil war. The Aragonese diplomat Guillén Palacín summed up the precariousness of the situation in a letter of 4 January 1313 to his sovereign Jaume II: 'en quanto entro a [Castiella] pude entender los feytos estos son muy grandes e estan a muy fuert punto de seer mayores.'²⁵

To their credit, the infantes Juan and Pedro realized at an early stage that the chances of either obtaining an outright victory in the regency elections were slim in the extreme. Before proceeding to Sahagún for his conference with the concejos of León and Castile, the Infante Juan visited María de Molina in Valladolid, declaring during an open discussion with her and Queen Constança that he was not in any way disposed to recognise Pedro as governor of the realm – a declaration which, of course, came as no surprise to them. But in a private conversation with María, the Infante Juan intimated that he might not be averse to sharing the regency, so long as he could have separate and independent jurisdiction over the areas in which he had strong support. On learning of this potential compromise, Pedro arranged an interview with his mother at Toro, a town to the south-west of Valladolid. Whether he was amenable also to the idea of sharing the regency is unclear. What is certain, however, is that his father-in-law Jaume II of Aragon had become more supportive of the Infante Juan in the wake of the latter’s diplomatic successes at Burgos and Benavente.²⁶

Pedro spoke to Juan Manuel near Ávila and invited him to the Toro meeting,²⁷ neglecting to mention the Infante Juan’s idea of splitting the regency since, of course, such an arrangement could scarcely accommodate the promises made by Pedro to the lord of Villena in November. Juan Manuel arrived in Toro in advance of Pedro, on or just before 13 February.²⁸ Whilst awaiting the arrival of his cousin, Juan pressed María de Molina to underwrite the November agreement. But, without revealing why, María would not so do.²⁹ Some days later, with Pedro yet to show,³⁰ the dowager queen let slip that her son and the Infante Juan could share the regency and that any previous deal made for the running of the realm was unlikely to be respected.³¹ Incredulous, Juan Manuel sought out the Infante Pedro, tracing him to Palencia, where the estates of Castile were meeting to adjudicate on the matter of the tutoría. The lord of Villena pressed his young cousin to confirm their arrangement. Pedro prevaricated, eventually declaring that he could not, 'ca el traya su pleyro [sic] con el infante don Johan por poner su amor con el'.³² Distraught, Juan Manuel concluded a pact of mutual help and protection with Fernando IV’s widow Queen Constança who, presumably, felt equally disillusioned as Pedro had promised her the crianza of her son Alfonso.³³

The Infante Pedro had taken a calculated risk. He had concealed his plans from Juan Manuel until the last minute, hoping that the cortes would ratify the new regency government before his kinsman could muster effective resistance. And his gamble would pay off in the long run, as we shall soon see. But in breaking his promise the lord of Villena, who could suffer all injuries save dishonour, Pedro had created an enmity which would be at the root of Castile's interior problems through the next two years.

The 1313 cortes of Palencia, details of which survive in the royal chronicle and court records, were attended by every Castilian aristocrat of note. Many of them, we are informed, showed up in this city with large companies of men-at-arms, suspicious of those whose voting intentions differed from their own. Because of this, it quickly became necessary to produce formal truces and to compel the antipathetic factions to lodge outside Palencia in different satellite villages. Initially, Juan Manuel and his men took up residence in Magaz. However, they soon relocated to La Morería, where the Infante Juan was staying. Queen Constança moved there also, from San Pablo. The physical locations of Castile’s nobility at this moment were, suffice it to say, an unmistakeable reflection of their political leanings. The defection of Juan Manuel and Constança, whilst entirely understandable, reportedly inflamed the Infante Pedro to such a degree that he wished to take up arms against them; but he was dissuaded by his mother María de Molina. With emotions running high, María determined that the concejos and the prelates of the realm must be left alone in Palencia to reach a decision on the regency.

The two groups duly considered the matter but could not concur. Some among them preferred the Infante Juan as sole ruler of the realm, whilst others favoured a government run jointly by María de Molina and the Infante Pedro. No solution to the impasse could be found. Consequently, a divided realm, consisting of two discrete tutorías, came into effect, with separate royal seals created for the different administrations.³⁴

Several towns and cities could not decide on who should rule over them, and soon the infantes Juan and Pedro, who remained in opposition despite their apparent readiness to cooperate in governing the realm,³⁵ began to fight over these places. The most significant contest seems to have been over who should run Palencia itself. Not long after the conclusion of the cortes, the Infante Pedro returned there. His presence instilled fear among those inhabitants sympathetic to the Infante Juan and they fled, allowing the young prince to assume control of the city. On hearing of this development, the Infante Juan moved to Carrión with a view to ousting Pedro from Palencia. Juan Manuel, we are told, left Peñafiel to assist:

et el Infante Don Pedro desque esto sopo, salió de Palencia de noche, et fuéle á tener el camino, et encerróselo Don Joan en Valdecañas en una casa fuerte que era de Don Guillen de Rocafuy: et el Infante Don Pedro veno y á la casa, et estudo y todo el dia: et Don Joan non lo falló por su pro, et non quiso salir dende: et el Infante Don Pedro estando y fasta hora de visperas, dexóle y, et non quiso más porfiar, et tornóse para Palencia. Et Don Joan salió de Valdecañas, et tornóse para Peñafiel, en guisa que nin pudo ir á Carrion á se ayuntar con los otros por recelo del Infante Don Pedro, que estaba en Palencia.

Whether the foregoing happened as described cannot be confirmed with other evidence. However, since this chronicled incident does not reflect obvious dishonour upon the lord of Villena, there may be reason to believe that it is not pure invention. Subsequently, the respective forces of the infantes Juan and Pedro prepared to give battle outside Palencia. But after a lengthy stand-off, they dispersed.³⁶

Following this episode the Infante Juan, accompanied by Juan Núñez de Lara and Queen Constança, made their way to the Manueline town of Peñafiel and there hatched a new plan to kidnap Alfonso XI. But the scheme was discovered and foiled by the Infante Pedro and his mother María de Molina.³⁷ Assuming the familiar mantle of peacemaker, María worked thereafter to reconcile Pedro with his uncle. According to the royal chronicle, the three got together at Arévalo '[et] pusieron su pleito en grand poridad, que fuesen tutores cada uno dellos de aquellas villas que los tomaron por tutores, et que fincasen por amigos'. This deal was against the wishes of Juan Manuel, Juan Núñez and Queen Constança, who favoured new regency elections.³⁸ Documentary evidence tells us that the arrangement had yet to be committed into writing when Pedro left for Granada to capitalize upon that kingdom's internal turmoil.³⁹

Juan Manuel was opposed to the Arévalo talks principally because he did not want the Infante Juan to enter into any arrangement with the Infante Pedro. The lord of Villena had ever more reasons to detest the young prince. Pedro had reneged on their deal to share the regency. There was the unsettling Valdecañas incident. And Pedro had recently attempted to purchase from the Infanta Blanca of Portugal the same properties which the House of Manuel had sought to acquire shortly before the death of Fernando IV.⁴⁰

In October or November 1313 Juan Manuel gave expression to his choler, attacking and plundering the above-mentioned properties and also Pedro's Murcian estates.⁴¹ This bellicose action gravely concerned Jaume II of Aragon, who, needing to give the feud between his brother Fadrique and Roberto of Calabria his undivided attention, wanted to see an end to the unrest in Castile, in particular the acrimony between his two sons-in-law. To this end, Jaume appointed Archbishop Gutierre of Toledo, a friend of both, to mediate. The archbishop spoke first with the Infante Pedro, at Ciudad Real. Though concerned about the damage being done to his estates, Pedro did not want to abandon his mission to Granada, and thus authorized Gutierre to adjudicate as he saw fit 'por poner pas et sosiego en la guerra et escusar muchos bollicios que podrian nacer si este no asesegase'.⁴²

The archbishop moved, as instructed, to agree a settlement with Juan Manuel. When or where they met cannot be ascertained, but we know from a memorial issued to an Aragonese messenger on 26 February 1314 that the following was agreed: Pedro should recognize Juan as both adelantado mayor en el reino de Murcia and mayordomo mayor del rey – offices which the latter had assumed on the death of Fernando IV – and acknowledge his right to the royal benefices which corresponded to these titles; and Pedro must also furnish him with 250,000 maravedis for the completion of the purchase of the Infanta Blanca's properties. The lord of Villena, in return, would acknowledge Pedro and his mother as regents, and compel his vassals in Huete and Cuenca to do likewise.⁴³

These conditions (essentially a list of demands) were not attended to immediately, in large part we may assume because of the difficulty in relaying information to Pedro, who was far away in Andalusia. Juan Manuel sent messengers to remonstrate with the archbishop over the delay. The latter retorted that any arrangement could only be authenticated with the signature of the infante. But this was untrue, for Pedro had given Gutierre plenipotentiary powers to settle the matter. The infante himself was also impatient for a resolution and on 20 February reminded the archbishop that there was no impediment: 'queremos el pleito asi como lo pusiemos en vuestra mano que por quinse dias nin por un mes que se aluengue que se non deuen quexar los mandaderos'.⁴⁴ But Juan Manuel was unaware of this communication and becoming increasingly frustrated.

On 22 February Jaume II sent the master of Calatrava Garci López to Villena with a message for Constança Manuel. The Aragonese monarch’s choice of courier was unfortunate. Garci López, it may be recalled, had provided a formal guarantee for the now discarded November regency agreement between the Infante Pedro and Juan Manuel. When Pedro revealed that he did not intend to honour that agreement, López failed to act, breaking his promise to Juan that 'uos ayudemos [...] et fagamos y todo nuestro poder porque se cumpla asi'.⁴⁵ The lord of Villena, not one to let such things slip from his memory, took retribution, seizing the master of Calatrava and locking him up. On 1 March Juan wrote to his father-in-law Jaume to explain what he had done and why, making it clear that he would not release Garci López 'fata que me de recabdo que me cumpla lo que me ha de cumplir '.⁴⁶ Two days later the king of Aragon, livid, responded in the following terms:

Nos pesa mucho lo que auedes fecho. E tenemos que auedes mucho errado cha [sic] fisiestes muy gran desondra a nos [...] e grand desondra a la infanta nuestra fija e vuestra muller a quien ell hiva a veer con voluntad nuestra. E desondra a uos mesmo e grand infamia en cuya fe hiua a la vuestra casa.

The Aragonese monarch's correspondence was delivered by the high-ranking courtier Gonzalo García, reflecting the gravity of the situation. By 9 May Juan Manuel's rage had abated, ostensibly because he had by then learned that the Infante Pedro was in fact not obstructing any agreement between the pair. The lord of Villena freed the master of Calatrava to return to the Aragonese court and headed himself to the diocese of Cuenca to stop his vassals from waging war against the lands of the infante.⁴⁷

The damage inflicted on the region of Murcia by this feud placed notable strain on the relationship between its inhabitants and the House of Manuel. In mid-December 1313 the concejo of Murcia had protested to Jaume Il about these bellicose activities,⁴⁸ and no later than 23 February 1314 it petitioned him for an assurance of safety and security.⁴⁹ When the Murcians announced in April that they were no longer prepared to recognize Juan Manuel as their adelantado mayor nor pay him rents for the upkeep of Murcian castles, the prince's lieutenant Pedro López de Ayala, neither a subtle nor a gifted diplomat,⁵⁰ threatened to exclude them from a security agreement recently arranged with the emir of Granada.⁵¹ Jaume II did not approve of this behaviour and on 25 April wrote to admonish Juan: 'no es aquesta buena manera por traer los de Murcia a vuestro entendimiento por que es en gran carga e grant infamia vuestra a Dios e al mundo.' On 1 May the king of Aragon dispatched Pelegrín de Montagut to the Manueline court to press the point again.⁵² This dispute marks the beginning of the difficulties which Juan Manuel would experience with the concejo of Murcia for the rest of his political career.

In either the third or fourth week of April 1314 the Infante Pedro returned to Castile from Andalusia. He would have preferred to stay in the South, as Granada remained weak because of its internal turmoil, but could no longer subordinate two outstanding domestic issues: his feud with Juan Manuel and the ratification of his political understanding with the Infante Juan. Both were tackled at a meeting in Palazuelos (Valladolid) during the last days of April. The settlement with Juan Manuel was sorted without serious difficulty, although contemporary correspondence indicates that the Infante Pedro was not entirely pleased with the settlement: 'del pleito de Don Johan fijo de Don Manuel como quier que me el demando pleitos muy agraviados que yo non fisiera en ninguaa [sic] guisa sabredes que me escusado ouiera yo de lo faser mas pues vi que uos plasia ende non quis faser fuerza en ello.'⁵³ The main articles of this settlement are not recorded in a single document but can be established from the content of separate private letters. In respect of the infante Pedro's land dispute with Juan Manuel, it was agreed that the latter should take ownership of Alcocer whilst the former would have Cifuentes and Peñas de Viana, with the remaining properties of the Infanta Blanca to be shared equally between the two. It was decided also that Juan should receive all royal rents due to him by virtue of his palatine titles, but must pay an indemnity for the damage done to royal property during his recent campaign of devastation. To seal this agreement, rehenes were to be exchanged: Pedro was to relinquish custody of Berlanga to Juan Manuel, and hold Escalona in return.⁵⁴ There may have been other terms and conditions, but we do not know them.

Pedro’s second issue did not prove vexing as the Infante Juan's enthusiasm for a shared regency had not wilted, evidenced by his assurance to the king of Aragon before Pedro's return that 'por lo mio no se pasara de faser et complir todas las cosas que fueren seruiçio de Dios et del Rey don Alfonso mio sobrino et pro et pas et asosiego de la tierra guardando yo en todo lo que he de guardar.'⁵⁵ By 3 May Pedro, his mother María de Molina and the Infante Juan had formalised a friendship pact, putting them a step closer to joint rule.⁵⁶

All that remained was for a blueprint for government to be produced and ratified. This happened at a new meeting held in Palazuelos around the first week of August 1314. The main points of the arrangement were as follows: María de Molina would take on the crianza of her grandson Alfonso XI; the chancery would remain wherever the king was; elections to court posts would be made only with the consent of all three regents; the Infante Pedro and María de Molina could enter into the tutoría (regency district) of the Infante Juan only with the permission of the latter; similarly, the Infante Juan could not go into their tutoría without authorisation.⁵⁷

With his position at the helm of government now officially confirmed, and no higher authority to answer to, the Infante Pedro felt empowered to discard his new pledges to Juan Manuel. The high-ranking offices of mayordomo mayor del rey and adelantado mayor en el reino de Murcia , promised to the lord of Villena, were awarded to others.⁵⁸ Juan Manuel reacted predictably, waging war against Berlanga and pillaging other properties belonging to the infante Pedro.⁵⁹ Looking for someone to blame, he sent a vassal to the Aragonese curia to denounce Jaume II for subordinating the interests of the House of Manuel to those of the Infante Pedro. On 13 September Jaume responded to that criticism: 'si por auentura algunas vegadas vos semejaua que non uos mostrasemos aquella voluntad e amor que uos querriades era porque quisieramos que aueniesedes mejor en vuestras fasiendas de quanto por auentura a nos no semejaua que fisieredes.'⁶⁰ The king of Aragon had shown before his disinclination to invest in ventures, or individuals, of little promise, and it is clear from these words that he held little sympathy for the elder of his sons-in-law, who, in his current political position, had not much to offer. In contrast, the infante Pedro was now a decision-maker at the highest level. And Jaume would act as needed to safeguard his relationship with this young prince.

Before Michaelmas the lord of Villena dispatched a new embassy to the Aragonese court to set out his grievances against Pedro. What was said is not preserved in surviving sources, but this time Jaume, troubled perhaps by the thought of further unrest and destruction in Castile and Murcia, answered in a more conciliatory tone: 'tenemos mucho por mal lo que ha fecho [el Infante Don Pedro] contra uos. E desta razon entendemos enbiar a reprenderlo [...] e requerirlo que cunpla lo que prometido ha.'⁶¹

But Pedro had no intention of honouring his April promises to Juan Manuel and as the autumn of 1314 wore the latter became increasingly exasperated. The royal chronicle tells us that his disaffection was such that he repudiated his ties of allegiance to the Castilian Crown and ravaged 'toda la tierra de Huepte, et de Guadalfajara, et de Fita, et de toda esa tierra, et robó et fizo mucho mal et mucho daño en todos esos lugares. Et otrosí ficieron guerra de Escalona, que era suya, á toda esa tierra de esa comarca'. In response, we are told, Pedro had his forces strike Manueline castles in the neighbourhood of Huete.⁶² We know, moreover, from chancery evidence that a siege was established at Peñafiel around 24 November.⁶³

Like other men of his aristocratic standing, Juan Manuel was proud and could not have remained passive in the face of such a clear and brazen affront to his honour. His violent demeanour, of course, was not simply an act of revenge. it was also a means to an end. He had seen in recent years that aristocratic acts of force were an effective means of attracting the attention of those in power. Dealing with these acts diverted resources and manpower away from broader imperatives, including war against Granada. Consequently, it was in the interests of the ruling elite to find a way to curb such bellicose behaviour.

This is why, despite the grave and critical nature of the conflict between Juan Manuel and the Infante Pedro, the master of Calatrava Garci Lopez was able to reconcile the two at Uclés around Christmas.⁶⁴ Disappointingly, few details survive about what was agreed in Uclés. We know for sure that López persuaded Pedro to restore Juan to the office of adelantado mayor en el reino de Murcia.⁶⁵ The property issue is less clear, and we probably have to trust the royal chronicle’s assertion that the two princes agreed 'que partiesen aquellos logares que la Infanta les vendiera, et que oviese cada uno su meitad en la compra.'⁶⁶ Pleased with what had been agreed, Juan Manuel entitled the master of Calatrava to the pechos and derechos of the village of Valdemoro in recognition of the latter’s efforts.⁶⁷

There is scant documentary information pertaining to Juan Manuel for the first half of 1315. This fact, coupled with the royal chronicle’s silence on him, would suggest that he was generally compliant through this period. In truth, tensions between the lord of Villena and the Infante Pedro persisted, likely stemming from the delay in granting the former the adelantamiento of Murcia.⁶⁸ It could be that Pedro felt obliged to manage this at the upcoming cortes of Burgos, for during the Palazuelos regency talks of August 1314, Pedro, his mother, and the Infante Juan had agreed that 'en razon de los ofiçios de casa del Rey et de todo los Regnos que los non podamos dar ni toller sinon nos todos tres en uno'.⁶⁹ Ultimately, these cortes – convened no later than 20 July⁷⁰ – were to be remembered for a quite different issue involving the lord of Villena.

Juan Manuel was, in fact, absent from the cortes of Burgos. Fernán Sánchez reports that he had chosen instead to go to the vicinities of Berlanga and Almazán to pillage the Infante Pedro's lands,⁷¹ information that is largely supported by documentary evidence.⁷² At these cortes, the prominent Murcian aristocrat Guillén de Rocafull – who in 1313 had reportedly offered Juan refuge in Valdecañas from the Infante Pedro – addressed the Castilian court, uttering 'algunas palauras contra Don Johan que eran a desonrra de Don Johan'.⁷³ He then issued a formal challenge, asserting that the lord of Villena had dishonoured him by taking him prisoner.⁷⁴ We do not know when or why Juan Manuel had seized Rocafull (and we have no reason to believe that he did not). It may be worth listening to Juan Torres Fontes, who speculated that 'la vecindad de posesiones en la Mancha y la proximidad del adelantamiento de Murcia, que entonces ostentaba don Juan Manuel con Abanilla, en jurisdicción todavía de Aragón, quizá pudieran señalar el comienzo de la enemistad'. Torres also highlights that 'son años también en los que el concejo de Murcia negaba la obediencia a don Juan Manuel y le impedía la entrada en la capital del reino murciano'.⁷⁵

Whilst we cannot ascertain precisely what Rocafull said, his words were sufficiently inflammatory that the Infante Pedro 'fizo prender luego a don Guillen de Rochafuyll por lo que dezia cuentra Don Johan'.⁷⁶ Rocafull was set free some time thereafter, since there were no legal grounds for detaining him.

Around October Rocafull returned to Burgos and presented himself once more before the Castilian court, issuing a fresh challenge to Juan Manuel. The latter did not come to Burgos to answer it. The king of Aragon intervened, dispatching Pedro Garcés to Castile to interrogate Alfonso XI's regents on this incident and the new rift between Juan Manuel and the Infante Pedro. By 25 November Garcés had completed his mission.⁷⁷ He conveyed to the Aragonese courtier Gonzalo García the information he had gathered:

el infant don Pedro et don Johan Manuel an puesto todo su feyto en don Johan el infant et deuen se veer sobre esto don Johan e don Johan daqui a cabo danyo cabo Sepulvega e si don Johan Manuel quiere venir al serviçio del Rey e que se lexe de robar su tierra et adoba con linfant don Pedro creo que lo ent sacaran mal si el non responde como deue e si responde aversa a combatir su cuerpo al suyo segunt costumbre de Castiella e semellar mia quel senyor Rey [daragon] faria bien que enuias conseylar a don Johan Manuel que fisiese en guisa que saliese bien deste riepto quel infant don Pedro de voluntad es de fer en los aferes suyos e de don Johan Manuel quanto el Rey mandaria e assi lo enuia desir por sus cartas e lo ha dito a mi de palaura.⁷⁸

The wording is somewhat ambiguous and confusing, seemingly conflating the Rocafull challenge and the dispute between the Infante Pedro and Juan Manuel.

Juan Manuel would not answer Rocafull's call for single combat. On 14 December the Infante Juan wrote from Palencia to tell Jaume II that 'Don Johan [Manuel] que non quiso en ninguna guisa venir por si mismo a oyr el juysio', despite the fact that he had been asked five times to so do and had been offered the protection of a thousand knights.⁷⁹

The lord of Villena's unremitting persecution of Guillén de Rocafull in later years reveals how much this incident affected him.⁸⁰ He would never be able to forget it. Or perhaps he was never allowed to forget it by his enemies and detractors, who surely took every opportunity to mock and taunt him for his perceived cowardice.

Before Christmas 2015, Juan Manuel began a new campaign of destruction against the properties of the Infante Pedro.⁸¹ The Infante Juan, who had hoped to reconcile the pair once and for all, lamented the fact that his nephew had once more resorted to violence, reporting to Jaume II that 'lo fase por prenda por debda quel deue el'.⁸² On 13 February 1316, the Infante Juan was able to share more favourable news with the Aragonese court: 'loado a Dios ellos yo [sic] ya abenidos muy bien a seruiçio de Dios et del Rey et a pro de los regnos de Castiella.'⁸³ Whilst we have no direct evidence to tell us why Juan Manuel ceased hostilities against Pedro’s lands, It is sensible to think that his appointment to the prestigious military office of adelantado mayor en la frontera around this time was a key factor.⁸⁴

Very little is known about what Juan Manuel achieved between the spring of 1316 and the summer of 1319 because contemporary records for this period are very sparse. The dearth of evidence can be partially explained by the fact that this was a time of sporadic warfare between Castile and Granada, and archive material is seldom abundant for protracted periods of military conflict. At the Burgos cortes of 1315 the Infante Pedro had persuaded the estates of Castile to support his plan to recommence the Reconquest and in the spring of 1316, with Juan Manuel once again obedient, the young regent made his way south to commence the enterprise.⁸⁵ The Infante Juan was supportive of the scheme but remained for the time being in Castile, likely to oversee the implementation of the laws passed by the cortes of Burgos to address widespread lawlessness and corruption throughout the realm.

As the holder of the offices of adelantado mayor en el reino de Murcia and adelantado mayor de la frontera, Juan Manuel would have been expected to perform military duty against the Muslims either around the Murcian-Granadan border or in the vega of Granada. However, there is no evidence to demonstrate that he did either. It should be noted, though, that the silence of contemporary sources is not confirmation of inactivity, since these sources provide very limited information across the board on the Castilian military operations of 1316. Indeed, all we know is that the Infante Pedro, assisted by the masters of Santiago and Calatrava, the archbishop of Seville, the bishop of Córdoba and their companies, scored a significant victory over a Muslim army in May, and later captured the strongholds of Cambil and Alhavar.⁸⁶

In the following year the campaign against Granada gathered pace, boosted by the decision of the Holy See to formally recognise the enterprise as a Crusade and to assign to it ecclesiastical thirds and tenths.⁸⁷ At the start of 1317 the Infante Pedro raised a Muslim siege of Gibraltar and then captured the town and castle of Belmes.⁸⁸ But Pedro was compelled to return to Castile shortly afterward because 'el Infante Don Joan andaba bulliciendo quanto podia con los de la tierra contra él'.⁸⁹ The conflict with the Infante Juan was brought to terms by María de Molina at Cigales. And, after securing five servicios and one moneda forera for the holy war, the Infante Pedro returned to Andalusia, commencing before 6 August a new campaign of destruction in the vega of Granada.⁹⁰

The war against Granada was now being fought on two fronts. Before 3 October, Juan Manuel's lieutenant in Murcia, Pedro López de Ayala, suffered a heavy reverse at Lorca.⁹¹ This defeat was quickly avenged by the lord of Villena himself, although details of that success have not survived.⁹² We may surmise that his victory was achieved without the help of the inhabitants of Murcia who, due to grievances already described, were disinclined to obey the orders of their adelantado.⁹³

Around the close of the year Juan Manuel, needing money to pay the stipends of his vassals, sent letters to Castile's three regents asking for a share of the ecclesiastical revenues earmarked for the campaign against Granada. He did not receive a prompt reply. Vexed, the lord of Villena withdrew his men from combat and retired to Chinchilla, ignoring a belated invitation from María de Molina to come to Toledo to discuss the matter.⁹⁴ After some coaxing, Juan Manuel agreed to meet his cousin Pedro in the neighbourhood of Toledo for talks aimed at persuading him to return to the fray. No later than 15 February (1318) the pair celebrated a friendly interview in Ocaña, and the matter was resolved.⁹⁵ Within a few weeks the lord of Villena would meet Pedro again, this time to mediate a new dispute between the latter and the Infante Juan. By 26 April he had reconciled the two regents, and he was awarded the prestigious office of mayordomo mayor del rey in recognition of this accomplishment.⁹⁶ Around a similar time Juan Manuel established the Dominican monastery of San Pablo in Peñafiel, on the grounds of the castle built by his uncle Alfonso X. Renowned for its Gothic-Mudéjar design, the monastery held personal significance for him, for it was intended to serve as his mausoleum.⁹⁷

Thereafter Juan Manuel and the Infante Pedro returned to the South. In May the latter captured Tiscar, among the Muslims' most valued strongholds.⁹⁸ Next he sought to reduce Biedma but was unsuccessful. Victories through the summer evidently were few, for around mid-September Pedro felt compelled to conclude a truce of six months with the king of Granada. In a letter to Jaume II, Pedro explained that he had done so 'entendiendo quan quexados [los omnes buenos aqui] estauan por rason de quatro o çinco meses que avie que eran conmigo [...]. Et otrosi que en este tiempo deste plaso podria yo enbiar a Castilla a auer algun acorro para poder tornar mejor a este fecho'.⁹⁹

There is some evidence that Juan Manuel had similar challenges in keeping his men happy. Paying them was clearly a genuine issue, for we know that he was compelled to raise finances through the pawning of 'vasos e taças de plata et panyos et otras cosas suyas'.¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, he remained committed to the project against Granada, and when the six-month truce had run its course Juan wrote to his father-in-law soliciting the use of 'dos galeras con sus exarcias'. The king of Aragon, who thus far had made no contribution to the campaign, would refuse this petition, claiming that all his galleys were now in the hands of the citizens of Barcelona and Valencia 'que las an ya adobadas e las arman contra los enemigos de la fe e a servicio de Dios e an feyto ya toda lur costa'.¹⁰¹

The disobedience of the citizens of Murcia remained an issue. On 5 May 1319 the procurators of the concejo of Murcia met the Infante Pedro at Ubeda and set out a range of conditions which must be satisfied before they would recognise Juan Manuel as their adelantado mayor. The following are the most notable of these conditions: that the 'alcalles e alguaciles e jurados e almotacenes e todos los otros que tovieron otros oficios y en la çibdad' be allowed to render sentence freely; that all judgments pronounced since the outset of their dispute with Juan Manuel be deemed valid; and that the city of Murcia be granted significant fiscal exemptions. Pedro endorsed their petition. However, later that month Juan Manuel reported to the king of Aragon that the Murcians still would not receive him as their governor.¹⁰² Whether the lord of Villena had in fact made the necessary concessions to appease the Murcians is unknown.

In June, the infantes Juan and Pedro united in Cañete and led their forces into the vega of Granada.¹⁰³ By the 23rd of that month the combined army had reached as far south as the city of Granada. According to the royal chronicle, the Infante Pedro wished to press on further, but the Infante Juan thought it best that they turn back. The will of the latter prevailed, and on 25 June they withdrew. Their rearguard, however, was pressed hard by a large Muslim army headed by the formidable Uthman ibn Abi al-Ula, 'que era de los buenos caballeros que había entre los moros'.¹⁰⁴ The chronicle then reports one of the most calamitous events in fourteenth-century Castilian military history:

los caballeros [christianos] fueron [...] tan mal mandados, et tan embazados, que non ovieron poder en las armas. Et el Infante Don Pedro metió mano á la espada por la acapdilla, et nunca pudo: et á golpes se tollió todo el cuerpo, et perdió la fabla, et cayo muerto en tierra. [...] et desque lo sopo el Infante Don Joan ovo ende muy grand pesar, et tan grande fué el pesar que ende tomó, que perdió luégo el entendimiento et la fabla [...], et pusiéronle en un caballo; et al Infante Don Pedro pusiéronlo en un mulo atravesado, et fuéronse su camino: et desque fué la noche morió el Infante Don Joan, et en llevandolo, perdieronlo como era de noche, et fincó en tierra de moros.¹⁰⁵

Zurita offers an alternative explanation for the unfortunate demise of the two regents:

Y sucedió por gran descuido y por la discordia que había entre los capitanes, que se retiraron por gran espacio de un río que tenían muy cerca; y siendo el calor del día muy grande y muy excesivo el ardor del sol, padecían muy grande fatiga de sed; y así la gente de caballo como los peones se derramaron, buscando si hubiese algún arroyo o laguna de agua. Los moros se habían más cautamente muy bien reparado en los lugares que estaban cerca del río; y ardiendo el sol y la tierra con terrible calor, estando los infantes ocupados en ordenar y recoger toda la gente, que andaba como si no tuviera capitán, con la grandísima sed y angustia que tenían y con el sobresalto de no poder acaudillar la gente, sin ninguna herida, expiraron en las manos de los suyos.

It is difficult to know which account is correct (assuming either is), since of his sources Zurita reveals only that 'así lo hallo en relación de autor de aquellos tiempos'.¹⁰⁶

The deaths of the infantes Juan and Pedro would have a profound impact on the political career of Juan Manuel. With Alfonso XI still a minor, the lord of Villena, now aged thirty-seven, stood as the most capable politician in Castile and, ostensibly, the natural choice to take over the reins the government. Yet there were powerful elements within the aristocracy who did not want to see his elevation. The early years of Alfonso XI’s minority had been politically fraught, and the situation showed every sign of worsening.