CHAPTER 4

'Oviéronse a desavenir el Rey é el infante don Juan, é luégo se fué el infante don Juan del real é non quiso y fincar, é viniéronse con él (...] don Juan, fijo del infante don Manuel.'

The meeting of the Peninsula’s Christian monarchs concluded with a lavish celebration.¹ Thereafter, the leading members of the Castilian royal family, conscious that the autumn was almost upon them, headed for regions amenable to hunting: Fernando IV and the Infante Juan proceeded to Leon,² Juan Manuel to Huete.³ Around late August or early September the lord of Villena, yet to reach his destination, received information that a Muslim raiding force was attacking Aragonese property in the kingdom of Murcia. Motivated more, perhaps, by the need to protect his own properties than any great desire to assist the Aragonese crown, Juan put his hunting plans on hold and assembled a makeshift vassal army at his Cuencan stronghold of Garcimuñoz.⁴ The infidels’ military action seems to have been one of their infamous 'lightning attacks' – the guerra guerriada described with no small measure of admiration by Juan Manuel in El Libro de los Estados⁵ – for the lord of Villena had yet to leave Garcimuñoz when fresh tidings reached him that the invaders were returning to their homeland.⁶ On 20 September 1304 Jaume II wrote from Tortosa to thank his future son-in-law for his support in this affair, making plain in the course of that correspondence his irritation at this brazen violation of the Treaty of Agreda:

avemos enviado aquestas nuevas [de la entrada de los moros] al rey de Castiella e al rey de Granada para saber si el dito rey de Granada querrá seer en la paç, assi como puesto es, porque mellor podamors proveher a los afers. Jassea que muy bien nos fuessemos vengados del dito rey de Granada, sino fuesse por la paç e l'amor que avemos con el rey de Castiella.⁷

Not much more than a week later, Juan Manuel received a fresh dispatch from Tortosa: 'avemos avido cierto ardit', declared an exasperated Jaume II, 'que los genetes son tornados en el regno de Valencia.' To counter this fresh threat to his southern territories, Jaume had resolved to lead an army to that region and requested that Juan lend military support.⁸ Contemporary evidence does not show if the Castilian prince obliged, but it would be surprising if he did commit forces since it was neither cheap nor straightforward to mobilize an army at short notice. Moreover, considering the previous incident, Juan must have wondered if such lightning attacks were better thwarted with strong garrisons rather than ad hoc relief operations. Indeed, the king of Aragon may eventually have come to the same conclusion, for he would not stray far from the southern frontier of his kingdoms through the closing months of 1304.⁹

Around the second week of November, the master of Santiago Juan Osórez and the commander of Montalán Artal de Huerta, procurators for the Crowns of Castile and Aragon respectively, made their way to the kingdom of Murcia to take formal possession of the towns, villages and fortresses assigned to either side by the Torrellas commission. By 21 November the exchange of the designated properties was complete, save for the transfer of Elda and Novelda to Aragon. Osórez was expected to relinquish these two strongholds on the 15^th of that month but had failed to do so, ostensibly because Violante Manuel would not authorize the transaction.¹⁰ Juan Manuel's half-sister was obstructive because she had yet to receive a satisfactory indemnity for the loss of Elda and Novelda. Before 17 October Fernando IV had recommended that she and her husband the Infante Afonso of Portugal accept in lieu of the said properties the town of Pedraza, near Somosierra, describing it as 'muy buena villa e muy fuerte e muy bien poblada con aldeas e buenas et con muy buenos terminos e muy buenos montes';¹¹ but this place was not delivered over to the couple as expected. On 21 November Violante, disinclined seemingly to return to Portugal until the issue of her compensation had been settled, wrote from the Manueline property of Peñafiel imploring Jaume II of Aragon not to take over Elda and Novelda, nor collect the associated rents, until she had been indemnified to her satisfaction by the Castilian Crown.¹² A week later Juan Manuel, concerned that his half-sister should not suffer a diminution in her income on account of problems caused by others, sent from Escalona a note to Jaume asking that 'las rrentas [de Elda et de Nouelda] non sean embargadas a mi hermana e el embargamiento que es fecho que lo mandades desfacer'.¹³

The underlying difficulty could well have been that Violante did not consider Pedraza a suitable and convenient recompense for Elda and Novelda, for around the close of November Fernando IV was to propose that she and her husband take instead Medellín and Arroyo del Puerco, towns nearer the Portuguese frontier and thus easier for the couple to manage. This offer seems to have been accepted, but there were some problems with the conveyance of the latter property,¹⁴ and possibly the value of the rents involved, and on 7 December a disgruntled Violante reiterated to Jaume Il by letter that she would not relinquish Elda and Novelda to the Crown of Aragon until she had been properly compensated, recommending that he use his influence with Fernando IV to fix the matter.¹⁵ The Aragonese monarch responded sympathetically, instructing his bayle in the kingdom of Murcia, Pere Escrivà, to release to Violante whatever rents had been collected from these properties. On 14 December Jaume wrote again to inform her that he had done so and that he intended to raise the issue of compensation with Fernando IV at their forthcoming meeting in Ariza.¹⁶

The king of Aragon had arranged a new conference with his Castilian counterpart because certain aspects of the Torrellas settlement needed clarifying, most notably the demarcation of the revised Murcian border, the upper limit of which was rather vague. The meeting was scheduled for late January 1305 but was delayed by around four weeks due to the overrunning of conversations in Guadalajara aimed at resolving the escalating dispute between the Infante Juan and Diego López de Haro over the lordship of Vizcaya.¹⁷ Compensation for the House of Manuel was partially dealt with at the Ariza talks; it was confirmed that Violante should receive, as arranged before Christmas, the properties of Medellín and Arroyo del Puerco, with the archbishop of Toledo to adjudicate on whether the income from these two places was of comparable value to that which she received from Elda and Novelda. Although Fernán Sánchez would have us believe otherwise,¹⁸ Juan Manuel did not receive any indemnity for the loss of the Elche rents to Aragon. It is true that he had previously received Alarcón in lieu of Elche, but this was not much more than symbolic restitution since he was not entitled to any income from this Cuencan property.¹⁹ The lord of Villena harangued Fernando IV through March for a settlement.²⁰ The Castilian monarch resisted until around 23 March, when, for reasons to be explained shortly, he granted Juan full ownership of Alarcón,²¹ which we may reasonably presume included rights to all the rents and dues of this vast property, a verdant estate that bore little resemblance to the arid inheritance he had lost in 1296. Whilst these lands were more suited to agriculture and sheep-farming, we cannot be sure that they yielded an income greater than that of the Elche properties since, according to Pretel Marin, this era of Alarcón's history was characterized by 'repartos de tierras sin efectividad, retroceso urbano, vacío rural.'²²

The limited evidence at our disposal suggests that Fernando IV may have granted Juan Manuel Alarcón in perpetuity as a conciliatory measure to counter the danger posed by the alliance which Juan had recently concerted with fellow nobleman Juan Núñez de Lara, who too had emerged dissatisfied from the Ariza conversations.²³ This pact, which goes unmentioned in the Crónica de Fernando IV, was a cause of consternation at the Aragonese court also; chiefly, we may surmise, because of the rumour that the lord of Villena intended to cement it with a marriage to Juana Núñez de Lara.²⁴ Jaume Il's concern is attested by documentary evidence showing that he exerted pressure on Fernando IV to award hereditary ownership of Alarcón to Juan Manuel.²⁵ That Fernando did not particularly want to indemnify his cousin is suggested by the fact that in late March or April the Castilian king petitioned his eastern neighbour for compensation in the form of Cartagena; which, after some hesitation, Jaume gave up, presumably to protect the new-found amity between their kingdoms.²⁶

The establishment of the pact with the mighty Lara clan, a manoeuvre perhaps born of frustration over the failure of his alliance with the Crown of Aragon to deliver hitherto even the smallest material or political benefit, had yielded notable early fruit for Juan Manuel. And this relationship would prove of further use. The chief purpose of the recent Ariza meeting, as already mentioned, was to produce an accurate line for the northern stretch of the new Murcian frontier. But, owing to protracted diplomacy on other matters, Fernando IV and Jaume II had not managed to settle the matter. With busy itineraries militating against another face-to-face meeting, the two monarchs decided to appoint plenipotentiaries to produce a solution.²⁷ On 12 May those nominated – Diego García de Toledo (Chancellor of the Secret Seal in Castile) and Gonzalo García (chief adviser to the king of Aragon) – got together at Elche for conversations to that end. However, they were unable to reach a quick settlement, in large part perhaps because Juan Manuel had warned Diego García against seeking Aragonese proprietary rights to, or jurisdiction over, any Manueline lands in the vicinity. A May letter from Gonzalo García to his sovereign Jaume II shines a light on the difficulties caused by such interference, and treats us moreover to a contemporary opinion of Juan Manuel:

Sennor [...] Diego Garcia [...] e yo fuemos en Elche XII dias de Mayo e començamos a tratar [...] de los terminos [...] auemos examplado la uuestra tierra de grant partida que es y Sax que nos metían en question e Jumilla e Alcabdet e Yecla como quiere que uiniese dentro de los mogones nunca lo podiemos acabar con Diego Garcia diçiendo que antes nos daria seys jornadas de tierra de la del Rey de Castiella que no aqueste lugar ni otro semblant de Don Johan Manuel que luego querría auer emienda del Rey de Castiella sol por la senoría que bien conoçían ellos la manera de Don Juan Manuel que siempre faría redimir al Rey e que de tal guisa los auía escarmentado del fecho de Alarcón que entro al coraçon los plegaua. E assi viendo que no se podia fazer lexamos lo estar que no es lugar de recaudo saluo que caye en nuestra comarca.²⁸

It would take the two procurators seven full days to refine the border. It was eventually agreed that the new line should run south-west from La Encina through Almansa and Caudete, then between Yecla and Montealegre, continuing thereafter along the Sierra de las Cabras between Hellín and Jumilla down as far as the Segura river, the final course of which already defined the remainder of the border. The relative neatness of this new boundary, however, was spoilt by the decision to allow the Manueline property of Yecla to exist as a Castilian enclave within the area designated to Aragon. It seems unlikely that such an oddity would have been sanctioned had there not been acute concern at both the Castilian and Aragonese courts over Juan Manuel’s pact with Juan Núñez de Lara.²⁹

With Alarcón secured in perpetuity, and the Murcian frontier revised to his liking, the pact had served its purpose. And it had now outlived its usefulness. Around the third or fourth week of May 1305,³⁰ the lord of Villena, keen to re-establish himself at court, turned up at a meeting of the estates of Castile in Medina del Campo in order to put the record straight in respect of 'algunas cosas que eran mouidas en casa del Rey las quales no eran assi', as he would explain to the king of Aragon in a June letter.³¹ It seems clear that Juan Manuel intended to dispel the rumour that he planned to marry into the Lara family because, according to an eye-witness, he arrived in Medina 'con grant gent por reçelo de don Juan Nunyeç'. Moreover, there was between the lord of Villena and Juan Núñez 'una poca de bregua', deriving no doubt from the former's apparent manipulation of the Lara family.³² Concerned possibly about his safety, Juan Manuel did not stay long in Medina, exiting on or shortly before 26 May.³³ A delighted Infante Juan alluded to the matter in correspondence to the king of Aragon dated 29 May: 'finca asosegado don Johan Manuel para ser siempre a seruiçio del Rey de Castiella e uuestro e de seer siempre otrosi mio amigo e en la mi ayuda'.³⁴

Content now with his lot, Juan Manuel spent much of the summer hunting in his eastern properties.³⁵ It would appear that his relationship with the Crown of Aragon had not been gravely damaged by the rumour of his betrothal to Juana Núñez de Lara, for before 16 June Jaume II sent the Castilian lord a falcon as a gift,³⁶ and in the same month the pair exchanged cordial and playful correspondence on the theme of hunting.³⁷ The king of Aragon, however, was too careful an individual to dismiss such hearsay out of hand and so later that summer, anxious to bolster the engagement of his daughter Constança to the lord of Villena (and thus assure future Aragonese influence in Castilian affairs), he directed Aragonese procurators to compel the latter to hand over in pledge to the Crown of Aragon a number of strongholds as insurance against his taking another wife whilst Constança lived.³⁸ And on learning from Bernat de Sarrià that ecclesiastical dispensation for the union had been granted,³⁹ Jaume Il asked Juan Manuel to be at the Aragonese court for Michaelmas in order that they might revise the draft marriage contract.⁴⁰ However, before 5 September, and for unexplained reasons, the king of Aragon rescheduled the marriage talks for December.⁴¹

Due ostensibly to further problems on the Aragonese side, the December meeting did not happen. In the new year (1306), Jaume II wrote to Juan Manuel suggesting that he come to Valencia for Easter, when Fernando IV and his court would be visiting.⁴² On 14 March the lord of Villena set off from the castle of Garcimuñoz for the seaport, arriving there no later than the 21^st.⁴³ Relaxed and in good spirits, Juan would on that date confer upon Diego García de Toledo the castle of Madroñiz and its neighbourhood, presumably in recognition of what the latter had achieved at the Elche border talks of the previous year.⁴⁴ Not long after, the king of Aragon arrived in Valencia, whereupon negotiations commenced to produce a definitive marital contract. By 28 March terms had been agreed: the dowry which Juan would receive was to remain at 5,000 silver marcas, to be paid within a year and a half of the date on which the marriage was solemnized; the Castilian lord in turn was to pay Constança a bridewealth of 2,500 marcas; the infanta would reside henceforward in the castle of Villena, from where she could not be removed without the consent of Jaume Il until the marriage had been celebrated, which would happen when she reached the age of twelve (12 April 1312);⁴⁵ if Juan did not solemnize the marriage within a year of Constança's twelfth birthday, then the arrangement would be declared null and void; and if he concluded a different match before 1312, the Aragonese royal family would be entitled to the castle of Villena as compensation.⁴⁶

Three weeks later the Infanta Constança was transported from the familiar surroundings of Valencia's royal palace, with its lush gardens and idyllic views, to the rather bleaker environs of Villena, where, under the guidance and tutelage of an aya (foster-mother) named Saurina de Bessers,⁴⁷ she would spend her formative years.⁴⁸

The ratification of this marriage was a defining moment in the political career of Juan Manuel. Jaume II was compelled now to assist the House of Manuel in its political objectives which, of course, centred on achieving maximum influence in Castilian affairs and, by extension, acquiring greater landholdings (ideally with good strategic value and a solid income). The lord of Villena, his position underpinned by the mighty Crown of Aragon, was no longer obliged to turn to his Castilian peers for support to realize his aspirations. For that reason, Juan was able to avoid much of the aristocratic wrangling that characterized the period 1306-08.

As earlier stated, the marriage contract negotiations had been arranged to coincide with a meeting at Valencia of the Castilian and Aragonese courts. Jaume II had requested a personal interview with Fernando IV because he wished to discuss the idea of a Holy War against Granada. In the autumn of 1304, as we have seen, the king of Aragon had been acutely inconvenienced by Muslim border forays. He wished not only to avenge that action, but also to put a stop to further damaging incursions.⁴⁹ There was a minor obstacle in that Fernando had officially been on friendly terms with Mohammad III of Granada since August 1303. But the Castilian curia could not ignore the fact that the renewal of the Reconquest would provide the ideal distraction and focus for the bellicose energies of Castile's unruly greater aristocracy.⁵⁰

The March interview between Fernando IV and Jaume II did not happen, most likely because of the former’s preoccupation with the enduring and escalating quarrel between his uncle the Infante Juan and Diego López de Haro over possession of the lordship of Vizcaya. Through the winter of 1305-06 the Castilian monarch had done what he could to settle this litigation. But his endeavours were perceived by Diego López as partial toward the Infante Juan and in April the enraged head of the Haro family, supported by Juan Núñez de Lara, threatened to take up arms against the crown. Diplomatic endeavours to mollify these two formidable clan leaders could not achieve a result and in May Fernando determined to reduce them to obedience by force of arms.⁵¹

Juan Manuel sided with the Crown in this conflict. But he would not participate with any great measure of enthusiasm, more than likely because he did not wish to be perceived as an enemy by either the Lara or the Haro families, whose political friendship was always useful. On an uncertain date before 15 May 1306 the Castilian prince, resident at that moment in the town of Cuenca,⁵² received an instruction from his monarch to proceed with all the men-at-arms he could muster to the Laran town of Aranda (del Duero), where a royal force had put Juan Núñez under siege.⁵³ Yet by 26 May he still had not left Cuenca.⁵⁴ On learning this, Jaume II – fully supportive of the military project against Diego López and Juan Núñez⁵⁵ – sent a note to his son-in-law reproving him for his inaction; the latter responded that he had not made his way to Aranda because he felt that he could make a more telling contribution to the war by undertaking an operation against Moya and Cañete, Laran properties in the diocese of Cuenca.⁵⁶ The truth of the matter is probably that Juan did not fancy taking a vassal army on a journey of some two hundred miles across difficult terrain, to combat an 'enemy' with whom he had no personal quarrel, using a method – siege warfare – which was tedious, time-consuming, and in this era quite often unproductive. It is not inconceivable also that he had designs on Moya and Cañete,⁵⁷ properties that would nicely extend his Cuencan estate. Nevertheless, to appease his father-in-law the lord of Villena agreed on 26 May to make his way to Aranda.⁵⁸ There is no evidence to suggest that he did not do this; yet there cannot have been too much urgency about his journey, for by 1 June he had got no further than Mazarulleque,⁵⁹ and on 18 June he was in Atienza, still some 50 miles short of his destination. In this latter town the Castilian prince and his men would learn, doubtless to their great delight, that their march had been in vain: the siege of Aranda had been lifted and truces made with Juan Núñez and Diego López.⁶⁰

With his nobility for the moment obedient, Fernando IV sought again to speak to Jaume II about a campaign against Mohammad III. A summer interview was planned but this did not happen on account of Fernando’s poor health. The meeting was rescheduled to late November.⁶¹ Enthusiastic about the idea of a Holy War against Granada, an enterprise which might afford him the opportunity to emulate the heroic achievements of his grandfather Fernando III, Juan Manuel requested to participate in the meeting, and his interest was appreciated by both monarchs.⁶² However, on 14 November the lord of Villena would contact the Aragonese curia to excuse himself from that meeting. He had received some shocking news. His half-sister, Violante, was dead – murdered, according to hearsay, by her own husband.⁶³

The exact circumstances of Violante's death will probably never be known since there are no Portuguese records of the incident. Nor is the affair mentioned in contemporary Castilian evidence. What we do know is that the king of Aragon treated the rumour of her murder very seriously, as evidenced by his letter of 28 October imploring Dinis of Portugal to administer to the Infante Afonso 'muy grant escarmiento'.⁶⁴

The response of the king of Portugal to the affair is interesting. Dinis was on poor terms with his brother Afonso, who in 1304 had repudiated his ties of vassalage. Yet the Portuguese king did not impugn him, responding to Jaume that – quite apart from the fact he could not rightfully punish one that was no longer his vassal – he had heard Afonso give a full account of how Violante had in fact succumbed to illness:

Disenus que ela fora doente en Medelin en hun seu logar que ha no Reyno de Leon e que se manefestara e fazera seu testamento e partira seu auer assi como ela por bem teuera e porque aquela terra era muy doente [...] que a adusera para a Vide huun seu logar que ha na fronteira de nossa terra e que ali a aficara mais a door e que morrera e que fezera seu testamento a sa morte e lexara seus testamentarios.⁶⁵

Juan Manuel did not believe this story and pressed Fernando IV to summon Afonso before the Castilian court to answer questions on Violante's demise.⁶⁶ Regrettably, contemporary evidence does not permit us to know what happened next, but the fact that the Portuguese prince does not appear on the witness list of Castilian royal diplomas after 1306 (as he had since 1304, when presumably he and Violante had relocated to Castile) is an indication that Fernando saw fit to punish him somehow.⁶⁷

This unhappy episode did not cause Juan Manuel to miss the Reconquest meeting, because it was once more postponed, this time due to Jaume II’s poor health. The conversations were rescheduled for Easter 1307, at Valencia, where Aragonese physicians had recommended that Jaume reside 'fata entrada del varano'.⁶⁸

Before his interview with the king of Castile, Jaume II spent some time in the kingdom of Murcia. He was joined there by his son-in-law Juan Manuel. The latter had in the preceding year been restored to the post of adelantado mayor en el reino de Murcia,⁶⁹ an office which he had lost on an uncertain date between 28 November 1304 and 6 February 1305 – possibly for his over-zealous protests on compensation matters⁷⁰ – and was in the region to attend to associated administrative business.⁷¹ Juan and Jaume moved thereafter to Villena to see the Infanta Constança,⁷² and to check perhaps on the welfare of her aya Saurina, who was known to be homesick.⁷³ The plan probably was to move on next to Valencia for the Reconquest talks. But, again, these would not happen, due to the preoccupation of Fernando IV with internal difficulties.

In late February 1307 Castile's young sovereign had completed his arbitration on the Vizcaya question, the final judgement satisfying both the Infante Juan and Diego López de Haro. However, in solving one problem Fernando had inadvertently created another: Juan Núñez de Lara had become unsettled over the fact that his own land ambitions had not received similar attention. In the early summer, before a gathering of the realm's principal dignitaries (including Juan Manuel), Juan Núñez issued a formal defiance against his monarch.⁷⁴ Fernando IV sought a reconciliation.⁷⁵ But his efforts were unfruitful, and on the counsel of the Infante Juan (who remained his closest adviser) the king reluctantly stripped the head of the Lara clan of the office of mayordomo mayor del rey and expelled him from Castile.⁷⁶ The vacant office was promised initially to Juan Manuel, in recognition of his loyalty through the domestic troubles of the previous two years. But the mayordomazgo was eventually bestowed upon Diego López de Haro, probably to dissuade this magnate from returning to the side of the recalcitrant Juan Núñez. Juan Manuel had endorsed this change of direction, seemingly on the understanding that he would receive instead the similarly prestigious office of alférez del rey (Standard Bearer of the King), held at that moment by Diego López. But the latter would not relinquish it. Piqued, the lord of Villena sought help from his father-in-law, and on 11 September Jaume accordingly wrote to the Infante Juan asking that he use his influence at court to fix this matter.⁷⁷ If the infante did try to sort it then he was not successful: the witness lists of royal charters produced through the autumn and into the winter of 1307 show the continued occupation of the post of alférez by Diego López.⁷⁸ This incident created friction between Juan Manuel and Fernando IV, and in the autumn of 1309 their fragile relationship would famously break down, as we shall soon see.

In June 1307 the Castilian court had received news from Andalusia of renewed Muslim military activity, prompting Fernando IV to try once more for a meeting with Jaume II.⁷⁹ But war against Juan Núñez, who had refused to leave Castile, was proving a difficult distraction. In the opening months of 1308 further negotiations for talks came to naught.⁸⁰ Preparations, nevertheless, began for a campaign against the infidel: before 16 March the king of Aragon sent a messenger to ask Juan Manuel 'que fasa labrar el castiello de Villena' for the greater security of the Infanta Constança during the projected conflict;⁸¹ and in the same month Fernando IV gave instructions for the equipment of a fleet.⁸² With interior stability a sine qua non for any large-scale operation against a foreign enemy, Fernando was compelled around this time to expel three aides – Sancho Sánchez de Velasco, Diego García de Toledo and Ferrán Gómez – from his curia in order to prevent insurgence from a block of nobles headed by the Infante Juan and the recently reconciled Juan Núñez de Lara, both jealous of the favour and influence these aristocrats had accumulated at court.⁸³ Concerned to bolster his position, Fernando concluded on 11 May a pact of mutual friendship and assistance with his mother María de Molina, his uncle the Infante Juan, and his cousin Juan Manuel.⁸⁴

It was now imperative that the young sovereign sit down with his eastern neighbour Jaume II. Juan Manuel, the bridge between the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, remained at Fernando’s court in Burgos for a number of weeks, anticipating its removal to Aragon.⁸⁵ But tertian fever rendered Fernando IV indefinitely bedridden,⁸⁶ so Juan repaired to Peñafiel, arriving no later than 5 August.⁸⁷ In the early autumn he relocated to Atienza, a place where he could hunt and still be conveniently situated for the forthcoming meeting between Jaume II and Fernando IV.⁸⁸ Through the autumn Fernando's health continued to give cause for concern, but by December his strength had returned, allowing the two royal courts to convene in Ariza to plan the war against Granada.⁸⁹ It was agreed that the primary objective should be the taking of Granada's seaports, which were of tremendous strategic importance, managing trade and guarding the passage of all traffic through the Straits and across from Africa. Castile would lead the attack on Algeciras and Gibraltar. Aragon would, in parallel, strike against Almería. Once conquered, Granada would be divided up: Jaume would have Almería, Fernando the remaining territories. This arrangement was ratified on 19 December 1308 at Alcalá de Henares.⁹⁰

At the plenary cortes of Madrid, held during February-March 1309, Fernando IV, requiring finance for the project against Granada, secured from the estates of Castile five servicios (extraordinary grants),⁹¹ although not without great difficulty. Fernando had hoped to keep the operation against the Muslims a secret but, owing to widespread poverty across the land, his parliamentarians would not approve these extra taxes without first knowing on what they would be spent.⁹² And there were further problems. Juan Manuel and the Infante Juan, among others, were troubled by certain aspects of the Alcalá de Henares arrangement. For a start, they were against the redistribution of any reconquered land to the Crown of Aragon.⁹³ Contemporary sources are not clear on why this was the case, but we may conjecture that it was related to the fact that the king of Aragon had mentioned in Ariza that he was in favour of enlisting the military support of the Banu Marin,⁹⁴ revealing in so doing what little genuine crusading spirit he possessed. We know also that Juan Manuel was concerned that he might be forced to cede to Aragon property in Granada which he had inherited from his father.⁹⁵ Juan, furthermore, was displeased at being asked to assist with the Algeciras enterprise and rowed openly with Fernando IV on this matter at the Madrid cortes. The Infante Juan quarrelled too with his sovereign, over military tactics and the growing influence of the king's new favourite Juan Núñez, and left Madrid 'despagado del rey'.⁹⁶

The element of surprise lost, Fernando IV commenced hostilities in short order. By Palm Sunday (23 March) several minor victories had been scored: the bishop of Cartagena and his troops had captured the town and castle of Lubrin (Almería);⁹⁷ the master of Calatrava Garcí López had made a successful foray into Muslim territory;⁹⁸ and the Manueline vassal Juan Sánchez de Ayala had captured fifteen 'acollerats de Granada'.⁹⁹ Concerned for the safety of his wife the Infanta Constança now that war was in her vicinity, Juan Manuel wrote to Saurina de Bessers urging her to ensure that the governor of Villena, Ramon d'Urg, had the town plentifully supplied with provisions and was prepared for a siege.¹⁰⁰

The main operation against Granada commenced several weeks later. Fernando IV did not arrive in Andalusia until around 14 June (Córdoba),¹⁰¹ the delay resulting from his decision to visit Santiago 'por ferse caualer' before the relics of Saint James,¹⁰² followed by a protracted stay in Toledo awaiting the arrival from different parts of the realm of the ten thousand knights and five thousand auxiliaries that were to accompany him to Andalusia.¹⁰³ Sometime after the 14^th, the king of Castile was joined in Córdoba by Juan Manuel, the infantes Juan and Pedro, Diego López de Haro, and Juan Núñez de Lara. Military tactics were discussed. Fernán Sánchez records that there were differences of opinion between Fernando and his magnates on the matter of strategy, but that the will of the sovereign – who favoured the immediate application of siege tactics – won out in the end.¹⁰⁴ On 30 July the Castilian army began the siege of Algeciras.¹⁰⁵ On 15 August Jaume Il put Almería under siege too.¹⁰⁶

Initially, the campaign went well. On 23 August 1309, near Almería, an Aragonese detachment inflicted a crushing defeat in the open field on a Granadan army.¹⁰⁷ And around the same date a Castilian force headed by Juan Núñez de Lara, the archbishop of Seville, and the renowned knight Alfonso Pérez de Guzmán (a.k.a. Guzmán el Bueno, who in 1294 had sacrificed a son to prevent the loss of Tarifa to the Muslims) began an enterprise to capture Gibraltar, achieving a positive result no later than 12 September.¹⁰⁸ Thereafter, however, things went dreadfully wrong. Around mid-September the Marinid sultan Abu aI-Rabi abandoned his friendship with the Crown of Aragon to support his co-religionist King Nasr of Granada – who, artfully, would cement their new amity with the cession to Morocco of Algeciras, thereby pitching the Banu Marin immediately against the Castilians.¹⁰⁹ Further setbacks came with the death in combat of talisman Alfonso Pérez de Guzmán,¹¹⁰ and the mortal illness of Diego López de Haro.¹¹¹ And there was the desertion of the Infante Juan and Juan Manuel.

Historians are united in their condemnation of these two figures as traitors whose flight precipitated the collapse of the Christian project in Granada. Giménez Soler, for instance, describes their behaviour as 'uno de los actos más indignos de la historia de Castilla y de los de más resonancia de Europa', accusing the pair of abandoning Andalusia 'plenamente convencidos de que al desentar libertaban Algeciras de la dominación de los cristianos'.¹¹² But he, like others, renders judgement without having scrutinised the circumstantial evidence. Neither Juan Manuel nor the Infante Juan had begun the campaign in a particularly positive frame of mind: the former, as we have seen, was irritated that he could not take the fight to the Muslims in the kingdom of Murcia, as was family tradition; and the latter, far more experienced in the ways of war than his sovereign, had seen his military advice go unheeded. In fact, the nobility as a whole felt uncomfortable with Fernando IV's military tactics.¹¹³ And there were other unsettling factors. First, Fernando IV had over recent months established a close friendship with Juan Núñez de Lara (whose disloyalty through 1305-08 had been prodigious). The Infante Juan, for many years the king’s chief aide, now found himself on the margins, his position at court appropriated by a sworn enemy. Second, the timing of the siege of Algeciras was ill-judged: the searing heat of August had sapped the energy and enthusiasm from many of the Christian besiegers, and unrelenting autumn rainstorms further dampened their spirits.¹¹⁴ Third, the nobility had prepared for land battles and not a siege, resulting no doubt in a level of disillusionment and redundancy within the vassal forces that accompanied them to Granada. And, finally, the question of how to pay and sustain a large army seems not to have been properly thought through. The fact that Fernando IV was forced to pawn some of the crowns and jewels of his consort Constança during the operation bears testimony to this.¹¹⁵

The royal chronicle is rather vague in its commentary on the abandonment of the siege of Algeciras by the Infante Juan and Juan Manuel, reporting that they did so 'porque […] non andaba bien avenido con el Rey [...] é esto fizo él cuidando que pues él se venía, que no podria el Rey fincar en la cerca.'¹¹⁶ Chancery material is more helpful. In a letter of 17 October to Jaume II, the Aragonese viscount Jaspert of Castellnou (who was conducting a naval assault in support of the Castilian siege of Algeciras) reported that his men were desperately low on provisions and were demanding their pay; and, au courant with goings-on within the Castilian camp, he mentioned also that:

[el] Rey de Castella devia au Johan Manuel la quitacio de XX dies e tenien [sic] en Johan Manuel bones penyores daur qui valien C millia morabatins e non mun tava ço quel rey de Castella li devia tot XXVI millia morabatins e devia au Johan lemfant la quitacio de V dies.

He was to add that Juan Manuel, and the Infante Juan particularly, had made it plain that they could not go much longer without pay.¹¹⁷ And – significantly – that the latter believed Fernando was plotting his death.¹¹⁸

Good information is also found in a letter from the Aragonese special envoy the sacristán of Tarazona to Jaume II around a year later. Juan Manuel and his cousin had both spoken with the sacristán on the matter of their desertion. Fernando IV, they explained, had in 1309 worked to diminish their honour and standing in as many ways as he could, most notably 'non siguiendo ninguna cosa de lur consejo e apartandose dellos e poniendolos por ende en mala sospecha e en dizienda de las gentes e poniendose el Rey e toda su fazienda en manos de los contrarios dellos'. They felt great shame that Fernando believed that their enemies could serve him better. The king of Castile, furthermore, had promised to deliver, once conquered, Algeciras (and Tarifa also) into the custody of the Infante Juan; but he then retracted this pledge for fear of displeasing Juan Núñez and Diego López. And Fernando had let it be known that if the infante left Algeciras for Tarifa, as was rumoured, he would have him killed.¹¹⁹

Whilst we cannot know for sure whether the Infante Juan was indeed in mortal danger, we may reasonably surmise that this rumour left Juan Manuel feeling equally vulnerable, knowing that he had been the object of a similar threat in the autumn of 1303. Neither magnate would have been comfortable in the presence of the king and his royal guard, and it is understandable that they may have wanted to keep their distance. Abandoning the siege and returning to their own properties was the obvious way for the pair to protect themselves.

Whilst it may be debated whether Juan Manuel and the Infante Juan were justified in deserting the siege of Algeciras, it would be incorrect to say that their flight provoked the collapse of that operation. It was no doubt a blow. But the king of Castile had sufficient (and arguably a surplus of) men at his disposal: the estimated five hundred knights that departed with the lord of Villena and his cousin were replaced almost immediately with four hundred knights serving under Fernado’s brother the Infante Felipe and the archbishop of Santiago, newly arrived from Castile;¹²⁰ the men that had reduced Gibraltar were available; and, as already mentioned, many aristocrats had brought with them more troops than were needed for siege tactics. The siege of Algeciras, in fact, remained intact until the end of January 1310, some three months beyond the departure of the Infante Juan and Juan Manuel. The royal chronicler Fernán Sánchez points out that, in the weeks leading up to the lifting of the siege, the Castilian army 'era mucho afincada de pobreza' and the king of Castile 'non tenía aver' to give to his men.¹²¹ These were surely the most significant factors in the failure of the operation to capture Algeciras.

There were a few crumbs of comfort for Fernando IV. His royal army had secured Gibraltar. And he was able to elicit from the beleaguered Muslims at Algeciras a truce arrangement binding them to deliver over to Castile the towns and castles of Quesada and Bedmar, 50,000 doblas, and render an annual tribute of 15,000 doblas.¹²² Nevertheless these were, as González Mínguez puts it, 'resultados desproporcionados a los esfuerzos que habían sido hechos'.¹²³

For Jaume Il there was no consolation whatsoever. He was compelled to lift the siege of Almería by the terms of the Algeciras truce. He did not benefit in any way from its provisions. And he witnessed many of his men perish on the return journey to Aragon.¹²⁴ He would attach blame for this miserable outcome to Juan Manuel and the Infante Juan. The Aragonese monarch had done what he could to persuade them to remain in Algeciras. And after their departure he had insisted that they return, or at the very least put themselves 'en alguno aquellos lugares en frontera a servicio de Dios e del Rey de Castiella e a bien de los fechos faciendo danyo e mal a los moros'. But the two princes ignored his instructions.¹²⁵ They would have cause to regret their behaviour. The king of Aragon, up to that point their principal patron, sidelined the two Castilian royals thereafter and sought to establish political ties with more reliable and co-operative magnates from Castile.

In April 1310 the lord of Villena and his ageing kinsman the Infante Juan, isolated and no doubt missing the cut and thrust of Castilian political life, sought a reconciliation with Ferando IV. The Castilian monarch, who still harboured ambitions of conquering Granada,¹²⁶ was amenable to their overtures. But he was still in Andalusia, so conciliatory talks were conducted at Valladolid by María de Molina and the reinstated courtier Sancho Sánchez de Velasco.¹²⁷ González Mínguez asserts that 'en Valladolid no se consiguió nada positivo', but does not provide evidence to support this claim.¹²⁸

News of this conciliatory meeting brought some cheer to Jaume Il of Aragon.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, he remained indignant toward and suspicious of his son-in-law Juan Manuel, as evidenced by a terse and frosty letter stating that since 'los fechos del Rey de Castiella e nuestros con el Rey de Granada estan en dupdo', the Castilian prince should not delay in ensuring that 'en el castiello [de Villena] aya mellor recabdo de retinençia e de vianda que noya'.¹³⁰ Jaume was, of course, solely concerned for the welfare of his daughter. Juan offered a practical alternative, namely that Constança be relocated from the front line to a Manueline property 'que no sea del regno de Murçia do el Rey quisiere'. But the Aragonese sovereign, perhaps suspecting that if the infanta were allowed to reside outside Aragonese jurisdiction then Juan might take her hostage (their union had yet to be solemnized and thus could be reversed), was adamant that his daughter remain in Villena, notwithstanding the assurances from his son-in-law that 'todas las cosas que uos quisieredes que yo faga por que uos seades seguro que la vuestra onrra et de la infanta et quanto yo he puesto conuusco sera todo guardado faserlo he muy de grado'.¹³¹ Frustrated, the lord of Villena sent Saurina de Bessers to the Aragonese court in Lérida to protest against such intransigence.¹³²

The relationship between Juan Manuel and Jaume II was at its lowest ebb. The latter was now openly soliciting alliances with other prominent Castilian noblemen, as illustrated by the donation of the lordship of Albarracín to Juan Núñez and the proposal of a marriage between the Infante Pedro of Castile and the Infanta María of Aragon. The breakdown in relations is vividly illustrated by Juan’s refusal to speak to the Aragonese envoy Guillén Palacín in July 2010.¹³³

Lacking any dependable ally other than his equally alienated kinsman the Infante Juan, Juan Manuel had little choice but to reconcile with Fernando IV. Upon learning around the end of the summer that the Castilian court was returning from the South,¹³⁴ the lord of Villena made his way to Consuegra, a stopping-point on the route out of Andalusia. Fernando received his cousin well and, keener to have him as a friend than a foe, bestowed upon him the prized office of mayordomo mayor del rey and urged him to persuade the Infante Juan to come to Burgos to receive similar favour.¹³⁵ Juan Manuel did as he was bid. The infante was initially reluctant to present himself at court, fearing that he might be ambushed and put to the sword. But he acquiesced when María de Molina promised to guarantee his safety.

The following testimony of the royal chronicle is supported by contemporary documentary evidence. On the night of Wednesday 21 January 2011, María's chancellor, the abbot of Santander, learned that Fernando IV had hatched a plan to assassinate the Infante Juan. The abbot immediately communicated his disturbing discovery to María, who at daybreak notified the Infante Juan's chancellor Fernán Remón of the plot. The infante left Burgos at once, using the excuse that he felt the urge to hunt heron around Quintana Dueñas. At the bidding of their monarch, Juan Núñez de Lara and the Infante Pedro gave chase. They were unable, however, to catch their quarry. The Infante Juan, badly shaken, sought refuge in Villalón and arranged for his strongholds to be provisioned for fear of a royal operation against him.¹³⁶

Juan Manuel, now head of the royal household, was with the royal court in Burgos when this incident occurred, but of the plan to kill the Infante Juan he knew nothing. Fernán Sánchez asserts that 'tóvose [don Juan Manuel] por engañado del Rey, é que por acabar aquello le diera el su mayordomazgo', and he is likely correct. Fearing no doubt for his own safety, the lord of Villena would slip away from Burgos himself not too long after, probably no later than 29 January,¹³⁷ repairing to Peñafiel.¹³⁸ In a letter of 6 March to Jaume II, Juan Manuel correctly imputed blame for this unsavoury incident to Fernando's closest advisers, the very same individuals whom the king of Aragon had been so keen to befriend in the preceding year.¹³⁹

The king of Castile came to appreciate the unwisdom of the Burgos scheme when the threat now posed to his realms by the unsettled Infante Juan and his ally Juan Manuel Juan made it impossible for him to march south to counter a reported Marinid invasion.¹⁴⁰ Vexed, Fernando asked his mother to find a way to reconcile the two disaffected nobles with the Castilian court. María agreed to do so, and on an uncertain date in early March she met her son's opponents at the church of Santa María de Villamuriel de Cerrato, near Palencia.¹⁴¹ The conversations lasted fifteen days and were fruitful, although no details have survived.¹⁴² On 25 March, Juan Manuel, suffering from a touch of tertian fever, apprised Jaume of the result of the conciliatory discussions. Keen to patch up his differences with the latter also, Juan promised to visit the Aragonese court 'de que sea guarido et pueda caualgar'.¹⁴³

But fresh difficulties were on the horizon. Fernando IV had arranged to meet the Infante Juan in Gritoja with the objective of producing a formal and satisfactory guarantee of the latter’s personal safety – the most important provision of any reconciliation. Before they were able to meet, the king of Castile fell gravely ill. Of his condition, an Aragonese envoy would write: 'esta en gran periglo e dubda que esta aparellado a lisiga e a otros accidentes pariglosos'.¹⁴⁴ By 18 April Fernando was much improved, healthy enough now to meet his uncle and also to contemplate a military expedition to Andalusia.¹⁴⁵ Unfortunately, a new illness took hold, altering the state of his mind, as Gonzalo García would report in a bulletin to the court of Aragon: 'el Rey [de Castiella] es todo sallido de manera por aquesta malautia que paresce que se seya todo abaldonado como ombre que no a cura de nada e no se lexa de caçar e trebella como que no fuese ninguna cosa los aferes en que esta.'¹⁴⁶ The precarious state of Fernando's health created political uncertainty, which in its turn engendered more aristocratic unrest. On 17 June the Infante Juan reported to the king of Aragon that 'asonose don Johan Nunnes con muy grandes gentes que avia ya quinse dias que se andaua asonado a furto', mentioning also that the aristocrat Fernán Ruiz de Saldaña was causing strife and that the king of Castile had dispatched his brothers Pedro and Felipe and 'quantos auia en su casa assi a caualleros como a escuderos et aun fasta los coçineros' to suppress him.¹⁴⁷ There must have been some doubt as to whether Fernando IV would survive his sickness, since on 26 June Juan Manuel felt obliged to inform his father-in-law that he intended, 'si del Rey [de Castiella] alguna cosa acaesciese lo que dios no quiera', to follow 'la carrera de verdad e lealdat'.¹⁴⁸

The fact that Fernando lacked an heir meant that there was a very real danger of a new succession crisis. His consort Constança was in actual fact heavily pregnant, but there was no assurance that she would bear a male heir, or even that the pregnancy would be successfully carried to term. Alive to that fact, the Infante Juan reached an understanding with his nephew Pedro that they should divide the realm between themselves if Fernando succumbed to his illness.¹⁴⁹ The Infante Juan travelled to Peñafiel to persuade his cousin Juan Manuel to attach himself to this new alliance. But the latter, unable to forget so easily what had happened in Burgos, could not grasp the wisdom of this scheme and did what he could to persuade his visitor to separate from the Infante Pedro. Juan Manuel loathed Pedro, perhaps for his recent attachment to the Aragonese court, and this hatred is evidenced by various pieces of contemporary evidence. On 26 June 1311 Juan sent a letter to the Aragonese court boasting of his refusal to have anything to do with this cousin of his.¹⁵⁰ Two months earlier, Juan had impeded the transmission to Pedro of the property of Salmerón, assigned to the latter as part of the contract for his forthcoming marriage to the Infanta María of Aragon.¹⁵¹ Later in the year, the lord of Villena would purchase from the Infanta Blanca of Portugal the properties of Palazuelos, Valde San García, Acevón, Alcocer, Cifuentes, Viana and Peñas de Viana, the last four of which had been earmarked for Pedro, again as part of the marriage contract.¹⁵² But these obstructive tactics did not prevent the union, which, doubtless to Juan’s disgust, was eventually celebrated at Calatayud in January 1312.¹⁵³

By September 1311 Fernando’s IV’s mental health was much improved, helped perhaps by the news of the birth on 13 August of an heir, Alfonso, in Salamanca.¹⁵⁴ The succession question, however, had fuelled his aristocracy’s self-seeking urges. Several were reportedly unwilling to recognise the new-born as the legitimate heir to the kingdom of Castile,¹⁵⁵ and there was even talk that the Infante Pedro was scheming to usurp the throne from his brother.¹⁵⁶ The king of Castile worked through the autumn to mollify his aristocratic opponents, and was largely successful in this endeavour.¹⁵⁷ Most notable is his taming of the ambitions of the Infante Pedro by promising him the crianza (upbringing responsibilities) of Alfonso.¹⁵⁸ Juan Manuel was appeased with property and income awards: Molina Seca to hold in usufruct; full ownership of Hellín and Isso; and the pechos (head taxes) and derechos of the villages of Valdemoro (Segovia) and Rabrido (Madrid).¹⁵⁹

In the spring of 1312 the lord of Villena, soon to turn thirty and back on good terms with the king of Aragon, sought to solemnize his marriage to the Infanta Constança. The ceremony, it was decided, would be held at the start of April in Xàtiva, where the match had been concerted nine years before. And on the first Monday of that month, Bishop Francisco of Tortosa duly married the couple in the town's main church. Those present at the event included Jaume de Xérica and the king of Aragon's sons Jaume, Alfons, Joan and Pere – all good friends of the groom.¹⁶⁰ A few days later Constança's aya Saurina wrote from Chinchilla to tell Jaume II that 'el seynor don Johan se capten molt ben della e ella es pagada del e ha li fetes uenir de Burgos II teles molt belles e la una es dargent e draps dor per a uestedures molt bells e teles per a totes les donçeles bon comensament fan'.¹⁶¹

Earlier that spring, Fernando IV had convened a meeting of the estates of the realm at Valladolid in order to raise money for a new assault against Granada, securing five servicios and one moneda forera for that purpose. The time was ripe for such an operation because Nasr, installed as emir in March 1309, was preoccupied with a challenge to his authority from the son of the arraez of Malaga. Around the close of April, Fernando left Old Castile for the South, capturing Alba de Tormes and Béjar in May.¹⁶² He returned briefly to Castile to settle the estate of a cousin named Sancho, who had recently died, and to secure supplementary funding for the Granada project. The king of Castile returned to Andalusia after 15 July, stopping in Jaén briefly before joining his brother Pedro at the siege of Alcaudete. Here Fernando once more fell ill and was forced to retire to Jaén to convalesce. On 4 September he received the cheering news that Alcaudete had fallen. But he could not enjoy the sweet taste of victory for long: on 7 September 1312, aged just twenty-six, Fernando IV gave up his soul.¹⁶³

Though broadly loyal to Fernando IV, Juan Manuel had enjoyed only rare moments of royal preferment. Of his peer group he had been the least unruly, not once resorting to arms to achieve his political and material ambitions. Yet he had received only a small share of the royal land which Fernando had delivered to his leading vassals in return for their obedience. And his income must have remained relatively modest, for documentary evidence shows that he had struggled to maintain his payments to the Infanta Blanca for the properties he had purchased from her in 2011.¹⁶⁴ His desertion of the siege of Algeciras in 1310 and his affiliation to the 1311 alliance against Fernando IV were driven, at least in part, by his increasing frustration over the minimal advancement of his career and estate during the years of that king’s reign. In the aftermath of Fernando’s death, Juan shifted strategy, drawing lessons from his contemporaries and turning with growing frequency to violent methods to secure his objectives.