CHAPTER 3

'E luégo enviaron por don Juan, fijo del infante don Manuel, que se viniese ver con ellos [...] é acordaron que enviasen mover pleito al rey de Aragon.'

Far from fanning the flames of aristocratic discontent in Castile, Jaume II strove through 1302 to secure a peace arrangement with Fernando IV. However, his endeavours did not bear fruit; chiefly, we may surmise, because the young Castilian king was distracted by domestic difficulties. In January 1303 an Aragonese embassy visited the Castilian curia and urged Fernando to set aside his home concerns and make his way to the court of Dinis I of Portugal, who had volunteered to preside over truce negotiations. On 27 January Fernando IV gave his word that he would be in Badajoz 'encima deste mes de febrero que viene'.¹

Before leaving for Portugal the Castilian sovereign, fearful that the Infante Enrique and Diego López might engage in treasonous acts during his absence, made a concerted effort to persuade these magnates to abandon their opposition to him and accompany the Castilian court to Badajoz. But it seems that Fernando succeeded only in intensifying their disaffection: chancery records show that on 17 February, whilst still engaged in dialogue with his young nephew, the Infante Enrique wrote covertly to Jaume II promising to help the latter become 'el mejor Rey e el mas onrado que nunca ouo en Aragon' if he would abandon his plan to reach an accommodation with the king of Castile.²

A period of intense diplomatic manoeuvring followed. Around the third week of March Enrique convened at Olmedo a secret assembly of disgruntled Castilian grandees, the most eminent of whom were Diego López de Haro, his son Lope Díaz, Juan Alfonso de Haro, and the twenty year old Juan Manuel.³ While the royal chronicle details how, during the months leading up to the Olmedo meeting, the Infante Enrique and the Haro family became increasingly disenchanted with Fernando IV's reliance upon and patronage of the Infante Juan and Juan Núñez de Lara, it does not reveal precisely when or for what reason Juan Manuel became unhappy with the Castilian king's conduct. Nor is chancery material particularly helpful on this point. The little we know about the lord of Villena during the preceding year indicates that he was not on bad terms with Fernando and his leading counsellors: in August 1302, as we have seen, he had attended the wedding of the Infante Juan's heir to Juan Núñez's sister. And he had not, so far as records show, participated in the aristocratic uprising of that autumn. Documentary material for 1303 shows that the king of Castile had promised Juan property around Atienza but not delivered it,⁴ and until we have reason to believe otherwise then we may presume that this was the cause of the strain in their relationship.

Castilian and Aragonese archives have yet to yield documents showing the details of what was discussed at Olmedo. While it is, of course, conceivable that the relevant evidence has simply not survived the passage of time, the content of letters sent by both the Infante Enrique and Lope Díaz around this date to Jaume II gives the impression that information about these talks was never written down lest it should fall into the wrong hands. It seems likely that the detail of the rebels' deliberations was passed on orally to Jaume by messengers of the Infante Enrique and Juan Manuel.⁵

On the substance of the Olmedo discussions some light is shed by Zurita. According to the Aragonese annalist, the Infante Enrique dispatched his mayordomo Gonzalo Ruiz to Almazán to inform Alfonso de la Cerda that 'queria[n] servirle y seguir su querrella el infante [Enrique] y don Diego [...] y don Joan hijo del infante don Manuel y don Lope Díaz [...] y don Joan Alonso [...] y todos los caballeros que eran de aquel bando. Y querían luego tomar su voz y recibirle por rey y señor natural del reino de Castilla y León.'⁶ Though it might be easy to conclude from the foregoing that Juan Manuel and his colleagues were so disenchanted with the rule of Fernando IV that they were prepared to have him dethroned, it is rather more likely that this declaration of support for the Castilian pretender was a device to compel Fernando to pay attention to their political demands.

Alfonso de la Cerda was likely too excited by the rebels' offer of backing to question their motives, his morale hitherto at a low ebb for several reasons: the defection of his friend Juan Núñez to Fernando IV in 1299; the papal legitimation of Fernando's rule in 1301; a tightening of relations between erstwhile ally the Infante Juan and Fernando in 1300; and the recent endeavours of another supporter, Jaume II of Aragon, to come to terms with the Castilian government. On 28 March the Castilian pretender dispatched an acerbic letter to Jaume, rebuking him for failing to respect their agreements and demanding that he make amends by pledging his support for the Castilian rebels.⁷

The Aragonese monarch, in fact, had already determined to link up with the recalcitrant Castilian barons, although principally for his own benefit: with the redoubtable Infante Enrique, the leading members of the Haro family and the increasingly influential Juan Manuel in his corner, Jaume would be better placed to negotiate for a favourable Murcian land settlement during any forthcoming peace talks with Castile. Around the first days of April 1303, Jaume II sent out his vassals Artal de Azlor and the prior of Santa Ana to establish diplomatic relations with the rebel alliance and extract from at least three of the four protagonists written pledges that they would obey and assist him and swear allegiance to Alfonso de la Cerda. If such pledges and oaths were forthcoming, then Azlor and the prior could formally guarantee 'por el sennyor Rey daragon lo que los ditos ricos homnes demandan que los atienda el Rey daragon'.⁸ On their route out of Valencia, these emissaries were intercepted by Alfonso de la Cerda who, surely unhappy at the idea of an Aragonese deputation speaking to these dissident nobles in his absence, convinced them to abandon their mission and return to the Aragonese curia, where he himself was headed for new conversations with Jaume II.⁹ No earlier than 10 April, a fresh delegation led by Artal de Azlor and Sancho García de Loriz set forth from Valencia, this time with Alfonso de la Cerda in tow, to rendezvous with the Castilian rebels in Almazán. But the meeting did not take place, because, by the time these three reached Almazán (17 April), the Infante Enrique and his cohorts, tired maybe of waiting, had gone their separate ways. Enrique was eventually traced to Alcalá de Henares, and the meeting was rescheduled.¹⁰ Around 10 May 1303, at San Esteban de Gormaz, discussions between the two sides belatedly commenced. The conversations were positive; Enrique, Diego López and Juan Alfonso de Haro were granted a formal audience with Jaume II, to be held in Ariza in June.¹¹

Juan Manuel did not participate in the San Esteban meeting. Following the Olmedo talks he had headed it seems not to Almazán but for the neighbourhood of Alarcón, in part no doubt to indulge his passion for the chase but mainly we may guess because the location was favourable for the prompt exchange of messages with the Aragonese court, located at this time in Valencia. This was of heightened importance at that moment because the Truce of Elche was due to expire on 5 May. But the articles of a fresh truce could not be worked out by correspondence, and so on 6 April Juan dispatched from Montalbanejo his chancellor Gonzalo Martínez and Pedro López de Ayala to solicit a meeting with Jaume II.¹² The aforesaid courtiers completed their mission post-haste and reunited with their lord either in Zafra de Záncara (a village which Juan had recently acquired through purchase or cessation) or nearby Cervera de Llano.¹³ They bore favourable news: Jaume had agreed to a short extension of the Truce of Elche (until 26 May) and had set aside a date, 8 May, for a face-to-face meeting.¹⁴

It was perhaps with a certain level of trepidation that Juan Manuel set off for his interview with the king of Aragon. The two, as far as we can tell, had met only once before, at Jaume's wedding to Sancho IV's daughter Isabel. Since that event, the Aragonese sovereign had harmed relations by repudiating Isabel (1295) and by seizing Manueline property in the kingdom of Murcia (1296 and after). It was only in recent weeks that the lord of Villena, as part of the rebel alliance, had demonstrated any willingness to be on friendly terms with the king of Aragon.

Juan Manuel arrived in Xátiva, the site chosen for his interview with Jaume II,¹⁵ no earlier than 7 May, the date on which the Aragonese chancery had produced safe-conducts for Pedro López de Ayala and Gonzalo Martínez, without whom the Castilian prince would not have travelled.¹⁶ The Aragonese court was already in this town, arriving there on or slightly before 3 May.¹⁷ Formal conversations between the king of Aragon and Juan, who on the fifth of the month had turned twenty-one, began on Thursday 9 May. If there was an atmosphere of wariness or suspicion at the outset of these talks then it quickly disappeared, for by the close of that day’s discussions the pair had agreed a political and military accord, sealed with a matrimonial alliance. The principal articles of the military arrangement were as follows: Jaume Il would protect Juan Manuel against all his enemies, including if necessary Fernando IV, but not the kings of France and Mallorca, nor the Infantes de la Cerda;¹⁸ For his part, Juan would, if asked, lend Jaume military assistance against all foes, excepting Fernando IV, María de Molina, the Infante Enrique, the Haro family, the Archbishop of Toledo, and the king of Mallorca; however, in the event of open warfare between Jaume II and Fernando IV, Juan would remain neutral.¹⁹ Of particular interest is this final clause. By undertaking not to involve himself in any conflict between the Castilian and Aragonese monarchies, Juan had effectively repudiated his ties of vassalage to Fernando IV, since as a subject of the latter he was duty-bound to assist when required on military operations. Juan had remained loyal to his cousin Fernando during the troubled opening years of his reign, but had received, as we have seen, scant reward for such loyalty. On the other hand, other members of the Castilian aristocracy had benefited handsomely from their disruptive political intriguing. On the evidence of this deal with the king of Aragon, the lord of Villena had by 1303 learnt much from his peers.

That Jaume Il considered an alliance with Juan Manuel of no small value is evidenced by the fact that, to cement it, he was disposed to approve a marriage between the latter and his second daughter, the three-year-old Infanta Constança. The association was, of course, mutually beneficial: Jaume knew that his influence within the orbit of Castilian politics could only expand with a young and upwardly mobile Castilian prince as a son-in-law. Juan, for his part, understood that with the powerful Aragonese king as his father-in-law, his political standing could only become more robust and his chances of recovering his Murcian patrimony were all but guaranteed.

The return of the Elche estates was, in fact, dealt with in the articles of the draft marriage contract, the most important of which were the following: on 26 May 1311 Juan was to receive custody of the Infanta Constança and a dowry of 5,000 silver marcas; on the same date – or earlier if he was prepared to recognise Jaume Il as King of Murcia – the young prince would recover Elche, Aspe, Chinosa, Monovar, the port of Santa Pola and all other properties which had formerly belonged to the Manuel family so long as papal dispensation for the marriage could be secured within three years;²⁰ if it could not, the union would be declared null and void.²¹

Festivities followed the signing of the alliance and marriage contract. Among the payments made by Aragon's royal treasurer around this juncture was one of 125 sueldos barcelonenses on 14 May to 'Lorens, juglar del noble don Johan Manuel', and another of the same amount on 17 May to 'P. Figuerola, ciutada de Valencia, los quales lo SR li mana dar per donar e per pagar aquels a alguns mariners qui menaren regatan e deportant en un leny en la playa de Valencia lo dit SR e el noble en Johan Manuel diluns a 14 dies del present mes de maig'.²² Treasury records further reveal that Juan received from the king of Aragon a gift of 'II penes vayres, qui costarem 520 sb.', and also a coat of arms made in Barcelona.²³

Whilst Jaume II covertly engaged in diplomacy with Castilian aristocrats, Fernando IV was working with the king of Portugal and the Aragonese plenipotentiaries Gonzalo Pérez and Ramón de Montrós to produce a truce between Castile and Aragon. Conversations on the subject began in earnest at Badajoz probably on 22 April,²⁴ and lasted until the 26^th, the date one which a truce of fourteen months was approved.²⁵ The event was probably not celebrated, since Fernando IV appeared to have knowledge of the Aragonese sovereign's machinations.²⁶ Nevertheless, the Castilian king continued to press for a formal conclusion to the war between Castile and Aragon, dispatching before 11 May Juan Núñez de Lara to Jaume II to offer Alicante, Guardamar, Monteagudo, and – if need be – Cartagena and Serón as a settlement to the Murcian land question.²⁷ But Jaume knew that once a formal alliance with the dissident Castilian nobles was in place, it would be the Aragonese court which would dictate terms for peace. Hence he was in no hurry to reach a political understanding with his western neighbour, as evidenced in his note around mid-May to his brother-in-law Dinis of Portugal asking that 'no ayades por mal porque nos luego non mandamos pregonar la tregua', offering by way of explanation for his reluctance to do so the weak excuse that 'nos avemos posturas e convinencias con [...] don Alfonso [de la Cerda] e no podemos auer paz ni tregua menos de su voluntad'.²⁸

Word of the Badajoz arrangement, nevertheless, quickly spread. When the Infante Enrique and Diego López de Haro discovered that a truce between Castile and Aragon had been approved and ratified in Portugal they became greatly agitated and pressed Jaume Il for an assurance that he would not deal with the Castilian government before their interview with him at Ariza. Jaume did not object, pledging before the close of May that 'no pongamos pleyto ninguno con don Ferrando qui se dixe Rey de Castiella nin con don Johan linfante nin con don Juan Nunneç nin con mandaderos lures nin ayamos vista con los sobredichos don Ferrando infante don Johan e don Johan Nunneç'.²⁹ Juan Manuel too had become unsettled. Following his conversations with the king of Aragon he had moved to Xorquera, intending thereafter to travel to Tamajón to meet his uncle the Infante Enrique.³⁰ But, on learning that the head of the Lara family was making his way to the Aragonese court, the lord of Villena, fearing no doubt that Jaume might be persuaded to conclude before the Ariza meeting a peace arrangement with Fernando IV, proceeded not to Tamajón but to the neighbourhood of Alarcón 'por destorvar a don Juan Núnnez', as he would explain to the king of Aragon in a missive dated at Zafra on 28 May, '[des]te camino que quiere fazer o enbaratarme con él'. In the same correspondence Juan Manuel urged his future father-in-law (just as Enrique and Diego López had) to have no dealings with Núñez nor any other emissary Fernando IV might care to send to the Aragonese curia,³¹ and in another letter dispatched three days later he would reiterate this:

si vos queredes amor del [infante don Enrique] e de don Diego e de to[dos los] otros nuestros amigos e que [fagan] todas las cosas que vos por bien tengades, [...] que partades la su vis[ta] en la mejor guisa que vos pudieredes e que vos non veades [con él] en ninguna manera.³²

No doubt Jaume would have liked to have listened to what Juan Núñez had to say before meeting Juan Manuel and his cohorts. But the Aragonese king did not wish to jeopardize the prospect of an accommodation with the rebels, so around the first days of June he dispatched a messenger to inform the head of the Lara clan that he must wait until after the Ariza talks before presenting himself at the Aragonese court.³³

Formal negotiations between Jaume Il and the Castilian rebels commenced no earlier than 17 June. By the 20th they had given a result: a formal agreement establishing friendship and mutual help, along with a set of demands that Fernando IV was required to fulfil: making the donation of Alarcón to Juan Manuel absolute, irrespective of whether the young lord recovered Elche or not; ceding to Alfonso de la Cerda the kingdom of Jaén and the towns of Almazán, Pedraza, and Val de Corneja; endowing his brother Fernando with a substantial estate; declaring the landholdings of the Infante Enrique transmissible by hereditary right; elevating Diego López de Haro to the dignity of count; bestowing upon Lope Díaz de Haro the prestigious office of mayordomo mayor del rey; and, finally, recognizing Jaume Il as lord of the kingdom of Murcia, and Requena. Fernando would have until Christmas Day 1303 to satisfy these demands. If he failed to do so, the signatories of the pact would wage war against him until he acquiesced.³⁴

To bolster the pact, Jaume Il provided a formal undertaking that he would make no separate peace with Fernando without the consent of new aristocratic allies. Moreover, he would lend them military assistance if the Castilian sovereign attempted to disinherit them or take away what was rightfully theirs. In return, the rebel nobles rendered homage.³⁵

After this meeting with the Castilian rebels, Jaume Il hastened to nearby Daroca to speak to Juan Núñez, who had agreed to wait there until the Ariza talks had concluded. Juan Manuel made his way to Daroca also, perhaps to ensure that Jaume's conversations with the head of the Lara clan did not in any way compromise the Ariza arrangement. Both reached Daroca on 24 June, only to discover that Juan Núñez, fearing perhaps for his safety, had left the region.³⁶ Content, perhaps, that the king of Aragon could no longer be swayed by the Badajoz arrangement, Juan Manuel bade Jaume farewell and made for his Cuencan properties.³⁷

Following the Ariza conversations, the Infante Enrique and Diego López had proceeded to the vicinity of Valladolid in search of María de Molina. They needed to speak with her urgently because they had pledged in writing to the king of Aragon that they would obtain before 15 August 1303 her formal approval of the Ariza pact and its conditions, and, additionally, her consent to a double dynastic union: the marriages of her daughter the Infanta Isabel of Castile to Alfonso de la Cerda and her son the Infante Pedro of Castile to one of Jaume Il's daughters.³⁸ That the king of Aragon was prepared to modify – or even scrap – the pact if the dowager queen did not comply is implied by the fact that such a deadline existed. This condition no doubt distressed Enrique, for he knew that while his erstwhile co-regent María was keen to drive a wedge between her son and his unscrupulous advisers the Infante Juan and Juan Núñez, her dislike of the Aragonese sovereign could easily prove an insurmountable obstacle for her subscription to the Ariza arrangement and consent to the proposed marriages.

It is known that illness prevented the aged infante from seeing María de Molina before the second or possibly third week of July,³⁹ yet on the 7^th of that month he gave a confident answer to written enquiries from Jaume Il and Juan Manuel on the question of the dowager queen's willingness to subscribe to the Ariza pact: 'estamos seguros [de la Reina] quel plase de quanto fagamos e aun de mas si lo y ouiese'.⁴⁰ Enrique's assurance did not wholly align with the update the king of Aragon had received from Diego López, who had met María in person on or before 5 July: 'quel plazia [a la Reina] de seer en todas cosas saluo en que don Alfonso se llame Rey. Et otrosi en pleyto del casamiento de su fij[a] que quiere que el pleyto venga por Roma porque el pleyto sea mas cierto.'⁴¹ Jaume would soon learn from his own sources that María's position on the Ariza arrangement was essentially as Diego López had reported it.⁴² The fact that the dowager queen was openly opposed to just one of the proposals formulated by the Castilian rebels and the Aragonese monarch must have come as a surprise to many – not least, of course, the Infante Enrique. González Mínguez's assertion that 'lo que pretende María [con esto] es ganar tiempo hasta que Fernando IV llegue a Castilla y pueda dar una solución definitiva' would seem at first glance to have much to recommend it.⁴³ However, there is documentary evidence that suggests that her position on a political understanding with Jaume II had genuinely relaxed, the most compelling of which is perhaps a letter from Bernat de Sarrià to the king of Aragon dated 15 August in which the former reveals that:

Dijous D dies anats dagost yo demaneu el dit Rodrigo los fets de Castella e dixme molt priuadament que certamente la Reyna auia otorgat quel Regne de Murcia romangues a uos e que ela heretaria conuinentment lo Rey don Alfonso e sou frare e entre les altes coses que li daria lo regne de Badayloç.⁴⁴

What María was and was not prepared to accept as a settlement in regards to Murcia and the Castilian succession was, in truth, of marginal importance since, whilst Jaume II seems not to have realized it, Fernando IV's mother at that time did not hold sway at court. Indeed, the question of whether she would endorse the Ariza pact soon became immaterial. Around the final days of July or the first week of August the Infante Enrique once more fell ill, this time mortally. If we are to believe the royal chronicle, the days leading up to his death were replete with intrigue. According to this source, the stricken infante told the leading members of his household that, because he had no heir to survive him, he wished upon his death that the bulk of his estate be divided between his nephew Juan Manuel and Lope Díaz de Haro. María de Molina came to hear of this and promptly informed Enrique's courtiers that their lord was to leave his lands not to the aforesaid magnates but to the Crown, whence they originally came. As soon as Alfonso Díaz – Enrique's closest aide and a staunch opponent of Fernando IV – learnt of the dowager queen's will in this matter he dispatched a messenger to the neighbourhood of Alarcón to urge Juan Manuel to proceed as quickly as he could to Roa. Juan, we are told, did so, and upon his arrival in that town discovered the Infante Enrique 'sin fabla é que non conoscia ya á ninguno'; and, thinking him dead, 'tomóle cuanto le falló en la casa, plata, é bestias, é cartas que tenía blancas del sello del Rey, é salió fuera de la villa é levó consigo cuanto y falló de don Enrique, é fuesse para Peñafiel'.⁴⁵

How much of the above historical testimony is true is difficult to determine since there is no relevant documentary evidence against which it can be compared. Despite his belief that 'de los hombres de aquel tiempo todo o casi todo es creible', Giménez Soler was unwilling to accept that Juan Manuel had committed '[un] hecho tan grave y horrendo' without other proof. His argument that the system of communications of that era would not have allowed Juan to reach Roa before the death of the Infante Enrique is not particularly convincing,⁴⁶ but his willingness to question the veracity of the testimony offered by the royal chronicle (which, disappointingly, many historians seem reluctant to do) ought to be commended, since its author Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid was neither an eye-witness nor a contemporary of the Roa incident. This royal chronicler was rarely charitable toward Juan Manuel and his fellow nobles, hence we cannot rule out his occasional sourcing of rumour and legend for historical testimony, not least when it might cause reputational injury to those working against Fernando IV. Whether he did in this instance we will never know, but the story does seem somewhat incredible.

No later than 11 August 1303 the Infante Enrique, aged seventy-three, breathed his last.⁴⁷ The rebel alliance would now die a slow death. Neither Juan Manuel nor his closest ally Diego López de Haro immediately abandoned the Ariza arrangement, but in the weeks which ensued both became increasingly aware of their isolated positions on the Castilian political stage and began to ponder how they might re-enter the favour of Fernando IV without incurring the censure of the king of Aragon. During the first days of September Juan Manuel, resident in Peñafiel, received a visit from Diego, the purpose of which was to establish a common position before they next communicated with Jaume. They discussed the complexities of the situation and decided that their best course was to share with the Aragonese monarch their desire to reach an accommodation with Fernando IV.⁴⁸ When Jaume learnt of their intention – either directly from Diego López, whom he may have met in Daroca,⁴⁹ or from the Aragonese courtier Gonzalo García, with whom Juan Manuel spoke around the end of September or early October⁵⁰ – then he probably did not protest greatly, since the tidings which had reached the Aragonese court shortly after 7 September, that Fernando had recently concluded a military alliance with Mohammed III of Granada and was readying an army for a joint venture against the kingdom of Murcia, would have made the king of Aragon realise that the balance of power in the Peninsula had just shifted and that he was no longer in a position to hold his western neighbour to ransom.⁵¹ Indeed, Jaume II may even have encouraged Juan and Diego López to come to terms with Fernando IV; if the pair were once again friendly with the Castilian monarch, Jaume could use their influence to dissuade Fernando from attacking Aragonese-held land in Murcia.

Toward late September Juan Manuel made his first tentative efforts to re-establish cordial relations with Fernando IV. Fernando, of course, was displeased that his cousin had struck up a pact with Jaume II of Aragon. But what would have especially nettled the teenage sovereign was the fact that recent letters sent to him from the Manueline chancery had omitted his title of 'King of Castile' in the salutations. The lord of Villena sent an embassy to the Castilian court to plead innocence over this and, rather boldly given the circumstances, remind his monarch of a request made earlier that year for land and rights around Atienza. No later than 9 October Juan received in Santa María del Campo Rus (Alarcón) what appeared, on the face of it, to be an encouraging response: Fernando had accepted his plea of innocence and hoped that he might come in person before the Castilian court to discuss the cession of the said property.⁵² But all was not as it seemed. Around the same date Juan Manuel discovered from friends at the royal court that 'la voluntad del rey no es contra ninguno mas que contra mí', as he would put it in a letter to the king of Aragon. Believing that 'la manera de que [el rey] me cuyda enpeeçer es esta: yr[me] deteniendo por palauras non me dando nada de lo que yo he de aver del, por que yo aya a gastar lo mío, e los mios vasallos non me lo pueden soffrir', the lord of Villena decided to decline his sovereign's invitation to the royal curia.⁵³

That Fernando IV was displeased with Juan Manuel was certainly true. Just how upset, however, the latter seems not to have realised. He soon found out. Not long after 9 October Jaume Il's trusted retainer Gonzalo García unexpectedly turned up at the Manueline court. He bore an urgent message from the king of Aragon: Juan must avoid any meeting with Fernando IV, or, if he could not, at least ensure 'que guarde muy bien [...] que no se meta en poder del dito Rey don Ferrando ni de ninguno de los suyos ni en lugar que sobreries le pudiesen seer ni echar mano de sus e que lo faga con gran seguridad', since Aragonese spies had recently discovered that 'tratamiento ha estado del Rey don Ferrando quel noble don Johan fijo del infante don Manuel se vea con el e an empreso que en la vista sea el dito don Johan preso o muerto'.⁵⁴ This intelligence confirmed the wisdom of Juan's decision to turn down the invitation to court.

The king of Castile, of course, scarcely lacked reasons for wishing a severe punishment upon his cousin. During the preceding six months Juan Manuel had: threatened to wage war against Fernando if he did not satisfy by Christmas a range of demands; sworn allegiance to a pretender to Fernando’s throne; and arranged a military alliance and dynastic marriage with a royal house technically still at war with Castile. The last straw for Fernando IV may well have been when Juan, in contravention of his feudal duties, refused in the early Autumn to join the royal host for a projected expedition to recover Aragon's conquests in Murcia.⁵⁵

The lord of Villena appeared to be in a no-win situation. The king of Castile could scarcely receive Juan back into favour whilst the latter refused to respect his bond of vassalage. Yet Juan was bound by written agreement to remain neutral in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between Castile and Aragon.⁵⁶ In a letter dispatched to the Aragonese court in late October, Juan Manuel appealed to Jaume II to release him from his obligation, arguing that, in his understanding, he could retain whatever agreements he had concluded with the Crown of Aragon provided that he did not refuse, when required, to join the Castilian royal army on its military expeditions.⁵⁷ But Jaume was hardly likely to countenance this in light of Fernando IV’s plans for war in the kingdom of Murcia. Displeased, no doubt, at his future son-in-law’s brazen and self-indulgent request that he be allowed to take up arms against the House of Aragon – for that was certainly the gist of the petition – Jaume rejected a request from the lord of Villena in the first days of November that certain Aragonese royal falconers be allowed to join him on a hunting trip around Alarcón. The Castilian prince, still young and lacking tact as a diplomatist, now found himself out of favour with two royal courts. Sometime after 14 November, and wishing to mend his relations with King Jaume II of Aragon, Juan personally travelled to the Aragonese court, the ostensible reason for this visit being that he had information concerning Diego López which he believed could not be communicated adequately by letter or envoy.⁵⁸

The conversations which took place do not seem to have achieved a great deal. When Juan Manuel broached the prickly subject of his military obligations, mentioning that he had recently dispatched a delegation comprising his trusted physician Ças and Pedro López de Ayala to the Castilian curia to talk the subject over with Fernando IV, the king of Aragon advised the Castilian prince to await the return of his courtiers, listen to what they had to say, and then take counsel of his vassals on what course to follow.⁵⁹ We may interpret this, perhaps, as Jaume politely counselling the young Castilian nobleman to be less impetuous and instead canvas more frequently the opinion of those of greater age and experience.

Ayala and Ças returned to their lord's court most probably before Christmas, and certainly no later than 7 February 1304. Their conversations with Fernando IV had not gone well; the young king, far from relenting on the issue of Juan Manuel's obligation to accompany the royal host into battle, had set a deadline by which Juan must declare himself either with or against the Crown of Castile. On learning this, the lord of Villena, conscious that he would have to come to terms with his sovereign sooner or later, must have feared that he would in so doing lose his friendship with Jaume II and, by extension, his marital arrangement with Constança also. But a sea change in Castilian foreign policy would rescue his position.

On All Saints' Day 1303 Juan Manuel and Diego López de Haro had been scheduled to present themselves before the Castilian court for substantive conciliatory talks with Fernando IV. But before 23 October the Castilian sovereign had, for reasons unclear, postponed such conversations until the latter part of November.⁶⁰ Deeming at that point a return to royal favour less expedient than the placation of his future father-in-law, and concerned no doubt for his personal safety, Juan, as we have seen, had preferred to visit the Aragonese king. Diego López, on the other hand, did see Fernando IV, and by 29 November had formally reconciled with his king.⁶¹ In the course of their conversations – before the conclusion of which, we are told, 'revocó [Diego] todo el pleito que pusiera con el rey de Aragón'⁶² – the head of the Lara family, recollecting briefly his political arrangement with Jaume Il, ventured that Fernando might contemplate basing any future peace settlement with Aragon and Alfonso de la Cerda on the proposals set down at Ariza. But the young monarch, who had just received from Dinis of Portugal details of a different scheme which seemed, in his words, 'muy mei[o]r pleito', would not entertain Diego’s idea.⁶³

Around mid-December, the king of Aragon received himself the Portuguese framework for peace, details of which have not survived.⁶⁴ Two weeks later, Jaume issued his own proposal for arbitration: a settlement in respect of the kingdom of Murcia should be worked out by the king of Portugal and two ecclesiastics – one from Castile and the other from Aragon – and must be approved by all three arbiters, whilst an arrangement for Alfonso de la Cerda should be determined by a tribunal consisting of Dinis, Jaume and 'una persona comunal digna de fe o religioso o seglar', the terms requiring the approval of at least two of these arbiters in order to become effective.

The king of Aragon tasked the Infante Juan with explaining the framework to Fernando IV.⁶⁵ The infante duly did so and by 24 January the teenage monarch had accepted them in principle.⁶⁶ A month later Fernando IV would send the Infante Juan back to Jaume with authorisation 'para tractar, facer, poner, et abenir [...] pleyto ó pleytos, ó abenanza, treguas, ó postura, ó posturas de pas, et de amor con el muy noble, et muy onrado don Jaymes [...] rey de Aragon'.⁶⁷

Though welcome, these positive steps toward peace between Castile and Aragon did not resolve the matter of Juan Manuel’s feudal duty. After Christmas 1303 the lord of Villena once again sought to persuade Jaume II to release him from his obligation to remain neutral if hostilities broke out between the two kingdoms. The outcome is not documented, but patterns of behaviour thereafter show that no progress was made. The deadline for Juan Manuel to confirm his allegiance to the Castilian Crown seems to have been set at around the middle of February 1304. Before the 7^th of that month Juan sent Pedro López de Ayala and Ças once more to the Castilian curia to press for an extension. In parallel, a separate Manueline delegation made haste to the Aragonese court to inform Jaume II of the extension request and to reveal also the advice that Juan had received from his vassals:

lo que el Rey [de Castiella] le enuiaba dezir [a don Johan] que lo no fiçiesse nin lo deuia fazer por la tregua que ha con el Rey daragon [...] lo que el deuia fazer que era esto: pues natural es del rey de Castiella que do el cuerpo del Rey fuesse que deuia ir con el con sus vassallos.⁶⁸

So, if compelled to choose, Juan Manuel would respect his feudal obligations ahead of his agreement with the Crown of Aragon. Unimpressed, Jaume wrote before 19 February to remind the Castilian prince that it was not a truce by which the houses of Manuel and Aragon were bound, but a pact sealed with a homage and an oath of fealty.⁶⁹

The expectation of universal peace and concord would soon soften attitudes on points of honour. On an uncertain date in May, Fernando IV delivered over to Juan Manuel the town of Aymesta,⁷⁰ a firm indication that by this month the latter had satisfied the conditions set by the former for a formal return to favour. Judging by the cordial nature of the correspondence exchanged between the Aragonese and Manueline courts during June, Jaume Il accepted that reconciliation with good grace.

With their differences now behind them, Juan Manuel and Fernando IV began to spend time together. Documentary evidence places the lord of Villena with his sovereign for at least nineteen of the forty days between 24 May and 2 July.⁷¹ The two had much in common: they were of a similar age and both fanatical practitioners of the chase. Yet it would be naive to think that the extended presence of Juan at court was unrelated to the fact that the pliable Castilian king would soon be negotiating with his Aragonese counterpart a settlement over the kingdom of Murcia, which had to include the resolution of ownership and jurisdiction issues relating to the Manueline properties located there.

Peace negotiations between the kings of Castile and Aragon had been scheduled to take place before 1 May, but quibbles over the finer points of the peace framework,⁷² as well as political strife involving Diego López and Juan Alfonso de Haro,⁷³ held them up. A settlement to the war between Castile and Aragon might not have been achieved until the following year (1305) had the Infante Juan – desirous of universal political harmony for the greater measure of protection it would give to his position at the helm of the Castilian government – not worked tirelessly from March through to June to bring the Peninsula's Christian monarchs together for formal conversations on the matter.⁷⁴ In July, a time and a place for the discussions was finally agreed, and around the first days of August the kings of Castile, Aragon, and Portugal arrived at Torrellas, a village on the outskirts of Tarazona, and began peace talks.⁷⁵

By 8 August, the principal issues of the war had been resolved. It was determined that Alfonso de la Cerda should receive an inheritance consisting of Alba de Tormes, Béjar, Gibraleón, Real de Manzanares, Val de Corneja and other minor places, all of which – significantly – were to exist outside of the jurisdiction of the Crown of Castile, and rents worth no less than 400,000 maravedís p.a.; Alfonso, in return, must relinquish to Fernando IV Almazán, Serón, Deza and Alcaraz, and desist from styling himself king of Castile and Leon.⁷⁶ On the same date, the kingdom of Murcia was formally partitioned: Murcia city, Lorca, Alcalá, Mula, Molina de Segura, and all other properties south of the line of the Segura river (save Guardamar and Cartagena) were awarded to Castile, with the properties north of that river 'enca el regno de Valencia, entro al más susano cabo del término de Villena' being designated to Aragon, with the exception of Molina and Murcia city, which straddled the Segura.⁷⁷ Though the division of the kingdom seems to have been fairly even in terms of land area and population, the territory allotted to Jaume II was of greater economic value, incorporating the important Mediterranean seaports of Alicante, Santa Pola, Guardamar, and Cartagena. Fernando IV, nevertheless, was happy enough to approve the adjudication immediately (9 August, Campillo),⁷⁸ and on 10 August, in Ágreda, he and Jaume II signed a treaty of peace and friendship.⁷⁹ Appended to this accord were the names of Dinis of Portugal and – at the instance of the king of Castile – Mohammed III of Granada.⁸⁰ Thus the date 10 August marks not only the formal conclusion of eight years of warfare between Castile and Aragon but also the formal restoration of Peninsula harmony, lacking since the Tarifa operation of 1292.

The Torrellas adjudication on the kingdom of Murcia was not especially favourable to the House of Manuel. The terms of that arrangement stipulated that proprietary rights to and jurisdiction over the lordship of Elche were to reside henceforward with the Crown of Aragon, as was jurisdiction over (but not ownership of) the lordship of Villena, leaving Juan Manuel in the curious position of being a Castilian vassal with property under Aragonese dominion.⁸¹ Juan, present at the Tarazona deliberations,⁸² had probably lobbied for both Villena and Elche to be put under Castilian rule since this jurisdictional scenario would have made the recovery of the latter property somewhat more likely, given the malleability of Fernando IV. Though he did not get his way entirely on this point, Juan did secure an important concession, namely that Jaume II would in the future convey ownership of the Elche properties to Fernando IV on condition that the latter cede to him before 15 August 1305 '[un] lugar que valga tanto en renda é homnes como vale Elg con sus términos é pertinencias'.⁸³

Violante Manuel, reunited with her half-brother Juan in Tarazona perhaps after many years apart,⁸⁴ was disadvantaged too by the Torrellas settlement, losing the properties of Elda and Novelda to Aragon. According to the account of Fernán Sánchez, Fernando IV undertook to recompense both Juan and Violante for their losses.⁸⁵ But the Castilian king did not put much effort into honouring this promise. As a result, relations between the Manuel family and the Castilian court were to become rather strained in the months that followed the Torrellas agreement.⁸⁶